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I.

INTRODUCTION

Interdependence is an underlying factor within numerous transnational environmental systems. This interdependence generates an interactive decision-making setting in which a state's choice of action is
contingent upon the expected behavior of other actors in the international arena. National decision-makers are aware that the quality and
quantity of essential environmental resources available in their territo-
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ries is determined not only by natural factors and their own behavior,
but by the actions of other states.
Attaining optimal results in an interactive situation frequently requires "collective action." Collective action occurs when the efforts of
two or more individuals are needed to achieve a certain outcome, one
which will typically further the interests or well-being of the group.1 In
terms of Pareto Optimality,2 the course of action which leads to the best
outcome for the group is cooperative behavior. The main problem with
collective action occurs when a rational individual's behavior leads to
Pareto inferior outcomes. This phenomenon often happens in large
groups and in situations in which all individuals agree about the com3
mon good and the desirable means of achieving it.
In his seminal book, "The Logic of Collective Action", Mancur Olson
rigorously presents the basic proposition that rational self-interested
individuals frequently will not act in concert to achieve common interests. 4 The negative repercussions of Olson's proposition for international environmental cooperation increases together with the ratio of
inter-state environmental independence. While environmental interdependence has long been apparent in the international arena, it has become increasingly prevalent in recent decades. In light of this rapidly
growing trend, as well as the deterioration of essential environmental
resources in most parts of the world, Olson's theory is particularly relevant to the international community today.
The Middle East environmental system exemplifies both the need
for and the impediments to successful regional collective action. Several diverse parties share the Middle East's primary environmental resources. Thus, when a party takes action in one jurisdiction it fre-

Lecturer, Faculty of Law and Department of International Relations, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I am grateful to Professor Edith Brown-Weiss, Georgetown University Law Center, for much valuable discussion and her insightful comments on earlier
drafts. Professor Shmuel Zamir, Department of Statistics, Hebrew University, and Philip
Warburg, Environmental Law Institute, Washington D.C., also contributed helpful comments. Thanks are also due to Ms. Tamar Rahamimoff, for her valuable research assistance. The views expressed are my own. This study is largely based on research I conducted while a visiting scholar at the Georgetown University Law Center, in 1996. I am
grateful to the Center for the excellent facilities provided to me during that period. This
article was prepared with financial assistance from The Israeli National Academy for Sciences, and I wish to express my gratitude for their generous support.
1. TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS

1 (1992). See

also Jon Elster, Rationality, Morality and Collective Action, 96 ETHICS 136, 139 (1985).
2. "An allocation ... of resources is Pareto optimal when it is not possible to improve
the well-being of one individual without harming at least one other." SANDLER, supra
note 1, at 13-14.
3. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 2 (1965);MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION 19

(1987).
4. OLSON, supra note 3, at 2.
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quently affects environmental resources in neighboring areas. 5 Such
interactive features characterize the Middle East's crucial water resources, marine environment and air basin. Some of the region's environmental resources are at significant risk and future developments
may further imperil their sustainable utilization. The peace process, if
successful, is expected to generate accelerated economic development
and industrialization in the region, particularly in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip. Increased economic development will place more pressure
on the region's fragile resources.
Efficient utilization of the Middle East's environmental resources
requires the parties to establish and implement cooperative arrangements. In the past, armed conflicts in the Middle East precluded almost any environmental cooperation among the parties. Indeed, the
first elaborated cooperative arrangements only emerged in 1994. The
environmental provisions in the recently concluded agreements between Israel and its neighbors 6 have a clear bilateral character. However, optimal protection and utilization of the region's environmental
resources frequently necessitates the establishment of cooperative arrangements on a regional level. Furthermore, the termination of hostilities does not ensure that an optimal framework for cooperation will
emerge in the future. Recall Olson's proposition regarding collective action failure: rational self-interested actors frequently will not act to
achieve their common interests, even when optimal results and the appropriate means of attaining them are agreed upon.
Avoiding collective action failure in the Middle Eastern environmental system requires an examination of the factors motivating or
hindering international cooperation. 7 Identification of these critical factors helps predict which environmental domains are more susceptible to
collective action failure. Armed with an understanding of the impact of
these factors, the challenge facing scholars of international law is to devise appropriate legal mechanisms to modify the structure of problem-

5. This article focuses on environmental resources available to Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
and the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The inputs of other states, like
Syria and Lebanon, are also taken into account.
6. See Articles 12, 25, 27, and 40 of the Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs to the 1995
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 36 I.L.M.
551 (1997). See Moshe Hirsch, Environmental Aspects of the CairoAgreement on the Gaza
Strip and the Jericho Area, 28 ISR. L. REV. 374 (1994), for a discussion on the environmental provisions of the 1994 Cairo Agreement. See also Articles 6, 18, Annex II, and
Annex V of the 1994 Treaty of Peace between The State of Israel and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan, 34 I.L.M. 46 (1995).
7. On the significance of this question, Elster states: "I believe there is no more important problem in the social sciences, and none that is more difficult. Understanding
why people cooperate and trust one another may be the first step toward bringing about
more cooperation and trust." Elster, supra note 1, at 141.
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atic settings to improve the prospects of cooperation. 8
Through the use of game theory, this article explores some of the
principal factors influencing the emergence and maintenance of international cooperation in order to develop legal guidelines for establishing
an effective environmental mechanism in the Middle East. As this article will show, game theory concepts and models provide a valuable tool
for analyzing the phenomenon of cooperation, enabling international
lawyers to shape legal norms which will enhance the prospects for environmental cooperation in the Middle East. Part II of this article sets
forth the basic concepts and models of game theory and its relationship
to modern international relations theory. Part III presents a game
theoretical analysis of two major environmental settings in the Middle
East: marine pollution in the Gulf of Aqaba and water contamination of
the Mountain Aquifer. It then suggests some legal mechanisms to enhance the likelihood of cooperation in these settings. Part IV concludes
the article by exploring the options and limits of combining game theory
and international law as an instrument to improve the prospects of cooperation. The article ultimately states that this combination offers
scholars and policy-makers important insights into better legal mechanisms for long-term international cooperation.
II.
A.

GAME THEORY AND COOPERATION

Basic Elements of Game Theory9

Mathematicians were the first to develop game theory, primarily
for use in economics. Later, other disciplines, such as political science,
international relations, law, sociology and biology also employed game
theory concepts. Game theory is a strand of rational choice theory,1 0
"designed to treat rigorously the question of [the] optimal behavior"1 of

8. Legal rules do not always aim to support cooperation. In some cases, the major
aim of a legal mechanism is to avoid cooperation. For example, anti-trust laws or legal
rules prohibiting criminal collaboration exist for this purpose.
9. For a general introduction to game theory, see DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE,
GAME THEORY (1991); ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS (1992);
SHAUN P. HARGREAVES HEAP & YANIS VAROUFAKIS, GAME THEORY: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION (1995); R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS:
INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL SURVEY (1957); JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR
POLITICAL SCIENTISTS (1994); ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION (2d ed. 1994);
JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR (3d ed. 1953).
10. See SHAUN HARGREAVES HEAP ET AL., THE THEORY OF CHOICE: A CRITICAL
GUIDE at vii-x, 3-25 (1992); MORROW, supra note 9, at 7-8, for a discussion on rational
choice theory and its basic assumptions,.
11. Oskar Morgenstern, Game Theory: Theoretical Aspects, in 6 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 62 (David L. Sills ed., 1968).
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decision-makers in "strategic" situations. The term "strategic" refers to
situations in which the outcome does not depend solely on the decisionmaker's behavior or nature, but also on the behavior of other participants. An important factor shaping an individual's choice is the social
setting or "structure" of a particular situation. Game theory enables social scientists to formalize social structures and then examine the im12
plications of the structure on individual decisions.
A "game" is any interaction between players governed by a set of
rules specifying the possible moves for each participant and a set of outcomes for each possible combination of moves. The decision-makers are
assumed to be rationalin the sense that they have certain goals, which
they strive to attain through their actions. They have a consistent preference ordering of goals, know the rules of the game, and know that the
13
other players are also rational.
Game theory represents interactions between participants in two
principal forms: the normal (or strategic) form game and the extensive
(or tree) form game. A matrix showing each player's payoff for each
combination of strategies often represents a normal game. The normal
representation is more appropriate for simultaneous decision-making
while the extensive form is more suitable to sequential-move games.
The latter form also displays the information each player knows when
making his decisions. 14 The basic elements of the normal form game include: (1) the players - the actors who make the decisions (either individuals or collective decision-making units like firms or states); (2) the
strategy space - the range of moves available to a player in a given
situation (i.e., to cooperate or to defect); and (3) the payoffs ('utilities') 5
the outcome generated for the players from a chosen move or strategy.'
A game theoretical analysis of social phenomena often does not allow for the allocation of accurate payoffs to expected outcomes. In some
cases, it is possible to assign ordinalpayoffs to expected outcomes (i.e.,
to organize the various outcomes in accordance with the order of priorities for the relevant player) and then to allocate a respective ordinal
number to each outcome. This method leads to interesting inferences in
numerous situations. 16 However, without knowing the "distance" be12. Id. See also Robert. J. Aumann, Game Theory, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: GAME
THEORY 1, 2 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987); MORROW, supra note 9, at 1.
13. FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 9, at 4; HEAP & VAROUFAKIS, supra note 9, at
1, 4-31; MORROW, supra note 9, at 7-8, 16-20.
14. D.G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 50 (1994); FUDENBERG & TIROLE,
supra note 9, at 67; GIBBONS, supra note 9, at 4, 115-16; HEAP & VAROUFAKIS, supra note

9, at 42-43 MORROW, supra note 9, at 58-69.
15. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 14, at 7-9; FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 9, at 4-5;
GIBBONS, supra note 9, at 2-4.

16. For a discussion of this method of assigning payoffs, see HEAP & VAROUFAKIS,
supra note 9, at 5-12; Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, 38
WORLD POL. 25, 46-48 (1985); see also STEVEN J. BRAMs, GAME THEORY AND POLITICS 13-
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tween the payoffs on an interval scale, one cannot accurately calculate
17
the probabilities with which each party would choose each outcome.
After reducing sets of interactions to a normal or extensive game,
the next step is to determine the game's solution. Finding the "solution" of a game serves a normative goal, as it may reveal the best strategy for a rational player. It also serves a predictive aim, as it may indicate how rational players are likely to behave in such situations. A
simple example is the notion of dominant strategy. A strategy is strictly
dominant if it is a best strategy (i.e., it maximizes a player's payoff), regardless of the other player's actions. When it is possible to identify a
single dominant strategy, one can safely assume that a rational player
will adopt the dominant strategy. Conversely, by identifying dominated
strategies, one can assume that rational players will not adopt them.18
While a strict dominant strategy will not solve many games, the
Nash-equilibrium solution applies to a much broader spectrum of cases.
A Nash-equilibrium is the combination of strategies, representing the
best response of each player to the predicted strategies of the other
players. Such a prediction may be called "strategically stable" or "selfenforcing" because no single player is interested in deviating from the
predicted strategy. 19
Game theory is divided into cooperative and non-cooperative game
theory, based on the enforceability of agreements and communication.
Cooperativegame theory assumes the existence of an institution capable
of enforcing the agreements concluded between the players; whereas
non-cooperativegame theory assumes no such institution exists. In cooperative games, communication between the players is allowed while
in non-cooperative games, communication may or may not be allowed. 20
Due to the lack of a central enforcement mechanism within the current
international system, this study is concerned with non-cooperative
games.

16 (1975) (using the ordinal method to analyze a specific case).
17. BRAMS, supra note 16, at 20.
18. GIBBONS, supra note 9, at 5; BAIRD ET AL., supra note 14, at 11-14; HEAP &
VAROUFAKIS, supra note 9, at 44-45; FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 9, at 6-8. A dominated strategy can sometimes be found by a process of iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies. See GIBBONS, supra note 9, at 4-8.
19. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 14, at 11-22; FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 9, at 11-

12; GIBBONS, supra note 9, at 8-9; HEAP & VAROUFAKIS, supra note 9, at 52-53.
20. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Noncooperative Games, in THE NEW PALGRAVE, supra
note 12, at 178; MORROW, supra note 9, at 75-76; HEAP & VAROUFAKIS, supra note 9, at
38.
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Game Theory and Modern InternationalRelations Theory

The basic assumptions of game theory are compatible with the basic assumptions of modern international relations theory. Prevailing
international relations theory assumes that: (1) States are the central
actors in the international system; (2) States are not subordinated to a
central international authority to enforce cooperation; (3) States are
egoists - they constantly try to maximize their interests; and (4) States
are rational - they have consistent, ordered preferences, which derive
from calculating the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action. 2 1
Clearly, assumptions (2), (3) and (4) are consistent with those of noncooperative game theory. Meanwhile, assumption (1) in no way contra22
dicts any of the underlying premises of game theory.
The concepts fundamental to international regimes, game theory
and cooperation, are interrelated. 23 Game theory explains the conditions under which international regimes arise as an instance of cooperation, suggesting conditions conducive to stable compliance with
them. Generally, international cooperation is a prerequisite to the establishment of international regimes. 24 However, cooperation, particularly short-term cooperation, can take place without the existence of international regimes. 25
Nonetheless in most cases, the creation of
international regimes facilitates the establishment of long-term cooperative patterns between States.
While game theory provides a valuable tool for analysis of international cooperation, game theoretical models do not take into account
various factors which frequently affect international cooperation. Such
missing factors include the personal characteristics of decision-makers,
as well as the social and moral values prevailing in their respective environments. On the other hand, game theoretical models do not at21.

ROBERT

0.

KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE

WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 18, 27 (1984); Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern InternationalRelations Theory: A Prospectus for InternationalLawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335, 346-50
(1989).
22. While the above assumptions largely reflect the neo-realist school in international
relations (the prevailing school today), both realists and liberals presume self-interested,
purposive and calculated behavior by states. See ARTHUR A. STEIN, WHY NATIONS
COOPERATE: CIRCUMSTANCE AND CHOICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 10 (1990).
23. The prevailing definition of international regimes is "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which the actors' expectations
converge in a given area of international relations." Stephen D. Krasner, Structural
Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasver ed., 1983). See also KEOHANE, supra note 22, at 57.
For other definitions, see Stephan Haggard & Beth A. Simmons, Theories of International
Regimes, 40 INT'L ORG. 491, 493-94 (1987).
24. See Kenneth A. Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and
Strategies, 38 WORLD POL. 1, 20-21 (1985).
25. Haggard & Simmons, supra note 23, at 504.
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tempt to address all factors relevant to collective action. Rather, they
aim to simplify and abstract reality by focusing on certain factors of
collective action while exploring the interplay among them. Such an
analysis seems simplistic, but the simplification proves useful in clarifying complex interactions. 26
Despite the imperfections which come from focusing on one set of
variables, and the difficulties associated with assigning numerical payoffs to expected outcomes, game theoretical analysis sets forth the expected trends of decision-makers as well as the decisions likely to be
adopted in particular settings. Furthermore, game theoretical analysis
frequently provides scholars and policy-makers with insights regarding
mechanisms designed to elicit and support stable cooperation.
C. Models of Collective Action
Each of the many collective action models presents a different payoff structure. This section presents the widely discussed models in
game theoretical and international relations literature. After clarifying
the basic features of each model, this section focuses on the prospects
for cooperation in each setting. It should be noted that the Middle
Eastern environmental settings do not accurately reflect the game theoretical models presented here. Frequently, however, it is possible to
identify a particular environmental setting which presents strong features of a certain game theoretical model. As such, the insights drawn
from the models presented below provide important indications regarding the expected trends of the decision-makers in these environmental settings.
1.

Zero-Sum Games

Zero-sum game is one of game theory's most famous models. Particularly during the early stages of the theory's development, zero-sum
game served as a polar case and historical point of departure. The key
feature of zero-sum game is that the sum generated for the players for
each possible combination of moves is zero. A game in which the sum of
the payoffs is always constant (not necessarily zero) is called "constantsum game" and its strategic analysis is equivalent to zero-sum game.
In zero-sum games, whatever one player wins the other loses. 27 Since
the payoffs to Player 2 are equal to the negative payoffs to Player 1, it is
possible to simplify the strategic form and only write the payoffs of

26. MORROW, supra note 9, at 8. For a discussion on the application of rational choice
models to international relations, see KEOHANE, supra note 21, at 65-74; Robert Jervis,
Realism, Game Theory and Cooperation,40 WORLD POL. 317 (1988).
27. FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 9, at 4; MORROW, supra note 9, at 74-75; VON
NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra note 9, at 46-47.
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Player 1. Figure 1 illustrates the payoff matrix for a two-person zero28
sum game:
Player 2

Player 1

S1
S2

S1

S2

2

2

1

3

Figure 1: A Two-Player Zero-Sum Game
The solution to a zero-sum game, as suggested by Von Neumann
and Morgenstern, involves the Maximin Principle,which directs players
to maximize their security levels. The security level is the least amount
that a player can receive from his move. The result of this game is an
equilibrium pair in cell SiSi generating 2 payoffs to Player 1, and -2 to
Player 2.29 This cell is called the "saddle-point." However, not all zerosum games have a saddle-point. 30 The Maximin Principle is not only
31
valid for a one-shot game, but applies to iterated games as well.
Two-player zero-sum games represent strictly competitive situations. The players maintain opposing preferences and are considered
rivals. As such, the players are in conflict and not inclined to cooperate.3 2 Zero-sum games may have more than two players (N-players
games) and some players may have an interest in cooperating against
the rest of the players (i.e., in forming a coalition).33 As one might
imagine, a two player zero-sum game represents one of the worst models for international cooperation.
Similar levels of competitiveness also exist in non-zero-sum. These
are games in which the players seek relative rather than absolute gains
28. This figure illustrates the famous Battle of Bismarck Sea in World War II; see
LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 9, at 64-65; BRAMS, supra note 16, at 3-4.
29. In the case represented in Figure 1, Player 1 (the maximizing player) should
choose S1, the strategy that assures him/ her at least 2 payoffs. Player 2 (the minimizing
player) should select S1, which would assure him no more than -2 (in comparison to -3
which may arise from S2). BRAMS, supra note 16, at 4; LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 9, at
64-65; Michael Bacharach, Zero-sum Games, in THE NEW PALGRAVE, supra note 12, at
253. For some criticism of the Minimax principle, see Bacharach, id., at 255-56.
30. Every zero-sum game with mixed strategies, however, has a saddle point; see
Bacharach, supra note 29, at 255. In a pure strategy, a player adopts a particular strategy throughout the game. In a mixed strategy, a player adopts a strategy that distributes
probability among several pure strategies; GIBBONS, supra note 9, at 30.
31. LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 9, at 103. 'One shot games' and 'iterated games' will
be explained in Part II.C(2).
32. LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 9, at 59-61; Bacharach, supra note 29, at 253.
33. MORROW, supra note 9, at 75; VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra note 9, at
220-22.
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(i.e., in military contexts where the aim is to achieve superiority).
When the game has only two players who are exclusively interested in
relative gains, the situation can be modeled as a zero-sum game with no
room for cooperation. The conflict diminishes significantly when there
are more than two players, or if the concern for relative gains is less
34
than total.
Pure zero-sum situations rarely arise in the international arena, if
at all. Strong features of zero-sum games are present in some international settings such as wars or sovereignty disputes over a particular
territory. 35 Fortunately, the utilization of common environmental resources almost never represents a zero-sum game. Most international
environmental resources are renewable. Thus, the sum of quantities
available to the parties is not constant, rather it depends significantly
upon the players' strategies. However, use of a shared, non-renewable
environmental resource, like fossil water reservoirs, 36 may lead the parties to adopt strategies commonly employed in zero-sum games.
2.

The Prisoner's Dilemma

The models discussed in the remainder of this section represent
non-zero-sum games, the most famous of which is the Prisoner's Dilemma ("PD"). 37 The PD model attracted considerable attention from
both game theorists and scientists in various disciplines because the
game's implications apply to a wide range of social phenomena. The
normal form of PD is presented in Figure 2: let C (Cooperate) equal

34. Duncan Snidal, Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation, 85
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 703 (1991). See Robert Powell, Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory, 85 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1303 (1991), for a further discussion on
relative gains.
35. See, e.g., with respect to the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians over
East Jerusalem, Moshe Hirsch, The FutureNegotiations Over Jerusalem, StrategicalFactors and Game Theory, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 699, 711-12 (1996).
36. On nonrenewable groundwater in the Middle East, see MASAHIRO MURAKAMI,
MANAGING WATER FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES 90-103,
182-83 (1995).
37. The game nicknamed Prisoner's Dilemma, attributed to A. W. Tucker, is typically
presented with the following story. Two persons, apprehended by the police with stolen
goods, are suspected of burglary and taken into custody and separated. The district attorney is certain that they are guilty of burglary, but he/she does not have adequate evidence to convict them at a trial. The district attorney explains to each prisoner (separately) that he/she has two alternatives: (1) to confess to the crime of burglary, or (2) not
to confess. If both of them confess, both will be convicted of burglary and sentenced to two
years in prison. If neither confesses, both will be convicted of possession of stolen goods
and given a six-month prison sentence. If only one confesses, the confessor will go free,
while the other will get the maximum sentence of five years. See ANATOL RAPOPORT &
ALBERT M. CHAMMAH, PRISONER'S DILEMMA: A STUDY IN CONFLICT AND COOPERATION
24-25 (1965); LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 9, at 94-95; Anatol Rapoport, Prisoner'sDilemma, in THE NEW PALGRAVE, supranote 12, at 198.
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"not confess;" and D (Defect) equal "confess." By convention, the first
payoff in each cell is to the row player, and the second payoff is to the
column player.
Player 2
Player 1

C

D

C

0.5,0.5

5,0

D

0,5

2,2

Figure 2: Prisoner'sDilemma
From Player l's perspective; if Player 2 chooses strategy C or D,
then Player 1 prefers D to C. Thus, strategy D strictly dominates strategy C. The same analysis holds true for Player 2, as C is strictly dominated by D. The result is that D is the dominant strategy for both players and cell DD represents the only Nash equilibrium for PD. As
explained above, in Nash equilibrium, no player is interested in deviating from his predicted strategy. 38 The result generated in DD (2,2) is
sub-optimal for both players who strongly prefer the result of CC (0.5,
0.5). PD represents a collective action failure. Since each rational
player is not expected to deviate from his strategy of confession, the
outcome of the combined strategies (mutual confession) constitutes a
Pareto inferiorequilibrium.
A situation is defined as PD and generates the undesirable results
noted above if the following inequalities among payoffs exist:
DC > CC > DD > CD
39
and 2CC > CD + DC.
PD is by definition a non-cooperative game and communication is
not allowed between the players. Yet even allowing the players to
communicate would not significantly change the expected outcomes of
the game. If the players could communicate, they would be expected to
agree to adopt strategy CC to generate better payoffs. Even after they
agreed, the structure of the game would not change. Without an
authority to enforce the agreement, each party would have a strong interest in breaching it because the payoff structure remains the same:
2CC > CD + DC.40
Increasing the number of players (N-players games) does not alter
the sub-optimal outcome of the game. In fact, the problem may even
38. See also, DAVID KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELLING 28 (1990).
39. See RAPOPORT & CHAMMAH, supra note 37, at 34-35.
40. See RAPOPORT & CHAMMAH, supra note 37, at 25-26; LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note
9, at 96.
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worsen because each additional player obtains a higher payoff if he or
she adopts strategy D in comparison to strategy C, and D dominates
C.41

The sub-optimal outcomes generated by Nash equilibrium in onestage games ("one-shot games") do not necessarily occur in iterated
games. The main point in iterated games is that credible threats or
promises regarding future rounds can influence the players' behavior in
the present round. Finite iteratedPD games involve situations in which
the players know when the game ends. Employing backward induction
logic, one can anticipate that players in these games will adopt their
dominant strategy of defection. When the game is iterated a finite
number of times, the players in the last stage will not concern themselves with how their action will affect future payoffs. Thus, rational
players will adopt their dominant strategy and "defect" in the last
round (as they are expected to do in one-shot games). On the next-tolast move, given the solid expectation of defection in the last round,
there is no incentive for players to deviate from the dominant strategy.
The same pattern of behavior is expected until the players reach the
42
first round.
Mutual cooperative behavior is expected in infinite iterated games,
or in finite games in which the players are not certain when the last
play will occur. Without a specific date for the last stage, there is no
starting point for backward induction logic, thus inducing cooperation
in the next stages by current behavior remains a viable option. The key
factor is that choices made in the present round not only determine the
outcome of this stage, but can affect payoffs generated in future rounds.
Future payoffs are, however, probably less important than present payoffs. This phenomenon is referred to as the discount factor. The discount factor represents the current value of a dollar to be generated at
some later stage. The discount factor (usually written as '8') falls be43
tween 0 and 1, and its relation to the interest rate (r) is 8 = 1/(1+r).
There is more than one strategy that can elicit cooperation in infinite iterated PD. The most famous is Tit-for-Tat, which achieved the
highest score in Axelrod's well-known experiments. 44 Tit-for-Tat is a
41. Rapoport, in THE NEW PALGRAVE, supra note 12, at 199-200; LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 9, at 97; TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 15.
42. Compare HEAP & VAROUFAKIS, supra note 9, at 168-69, and FUDENBERG &
TIROLE, supra note 9, at 111, and LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 9, at 98-99, with RAPOPORT
& CHAMMAH, supra note 37, at 28-29, and GIBBONS, supra note 9, at 224 (presenting experimental evidence).
43. See GIBBONS, supra note 9, at 68, 88; MORROW, supra note 9, at 38.
44. In Axelrod's experiments, professional game theorists were invited to send programs to a computer tournament playing iterated PD 200 times. Each participant wrote
a program which included a rule for selecting the cooperative or non-cooperative choice on
each move. The program had access to the history of the game and could use this history
in making a choice. Each program was paired with another program, including its own
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strategy of cooperating on the first move and then copying the other
player's previous move. In order to motivate cooperation by Tit-for-Tat
in infinite PD games, the players must not significantly underestimate
future gains. In other words, the discount rate should be close to one.
Generally, the likelihood of cooperation in such circumstances is increased together with the increase in three variables: (1) the discount
rate; (2) the payoffs associated with cooperation; and (3) the reduction
in the payoffs generated by defection. There is interplay between these
variables. For instance, when the discount factor is not high enough to
elicit cooperation through simple Tit-for-Tat strategy, using a more severe contingent strategy to decrease the payoffs for defection (like the
Grim Trigger)45 may remedy this shortage and increase the likelihood of
cooperation.
When the discount factor or the number of payoffs generated by cooperation is decreased, cooperation can be attained by decreasing the
payoffs associated with defection, particularly by harsher acts of retaliation. The possibilities of motivating cooperation by threats are,
however, limited. A player is not expected to take into account a noncredible threat; that is, a threat that costs more to carry out than not to
carry out.46 A strategy involving threats is considered credible if it
yields the threatening player, and other participants, the best outcomes
in the remaining stages of the game (i.e., constitutes a subgame-perfect
47
Nash equilibrium).
These results regarding cooperation in two-player infinite PD
games also apply to N-player games. 48 The difference is that in Nplayer infinite games, cooperation may emerge among some players

program. The program with the largest cumulated payoff won the tournament. Tit-forTat, which was submitted by Rapoport, won the tournament over the other fourteen programs submitted. The results of the tournament were published and a second round was
conducted. Out of the 63 programs submitted, Tit-for-Tat, which Rapoport resubmitted,
achieved the best score. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 27-54
(1984); Robert Axelrod, The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists, 75 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 306 (1981); Rapoport, in THE NEW PALGRAVE, supranote 12, at 200-202.
45. The Grim Trigger answers any move of defection with defection for all future
rounds of the game; MORROW, supra note 9, at 266. See also GIBBONS, supra note 9, at 9199. On other contingent strategies, see Martin Patchen, Strategiesfor Eliciting Cooperation from an Adversary, 31 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 164, 171-81 (1987).
46. HEAP & VAROUFAKIS, supra note 9, at 115-16; KREPS, supranote 38, at 49-53.
47. GIBBONS, supra note 9, at 57, 94-99. A subgame is a part of a game, or the part
that remains to be played beginning at any point at which the complete history of the
game is common knowledge among the players. For a precise definition of a subgame see
GIBBONS, supra note 9, at 94, and HEAP & VAROUFAKIS, supra note 9, at 82. A Nash
equilibrium is subgame-perfect if the players' strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium in
every subgame. See GIBBONS, supra note 9, at 95; see also HEAP & VAROUFAKIS, supra,
note 9, at 84.
48. HEAP & VAROUFAKIS, supra note 9, at 175-76.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 27:1

even if the rest consistently adopt a non-cooperative strategy. Such
partial cooperation is possible if the cooperative players cooperate on
the condition that the other cooperative players cooperate, and if each of
49
their discount rates is high enough.
The Prisoner's Dilemma attracted enormous attention from game
theorists and social scientists, especially after the publication of Axelrod's work. Many scholars believed that PD captured the problem of
collective action. PD became the paradigmatic example, as stated by
Rasmusen: "[w]henever you observe individuals in a conflict that hurts
50
them all, your first thought should be of The Prisoner's Dilemma."
Axelrod's optimistic message was that cooperation may emerge and
be sustained even among egoists operating in a system without a central enforcement authority. As previously stated, PD has been applied
to numerous disciplines, including biology, 5' economics, 52 international
trade,5 3 political science, 54 international relations55 (especially arms
control) 56 and law. 57 In addition, the model effectively represents the
problem of externalities and thus has been applied to several environmental collective action problems. 58 Some scholars 59 even characterized
the celebrated "Tragedy of the Commons" 60 as a PD. At some point, it
seemed that the model represented all forms of collective action prob49. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 82-105. In some groups, there is an inherent tendency
for exploitation of the great members (in terms of the size and extent of their interest in
the product to be generated by cooperation) by the smaller ones. See OLSON, supra note 3,
at 34-36; SANDLER, supra note 1, at 54-58.
50. RASMUSEN, supra note 9, at 18.
51. See, e.g., Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation,
211 SCI. 1390 (1981).
52. See, e.g., KREPS, supra note 38, at 39.
53. See J. David Richardson, The New Political Economy of Trade Policy, in
STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 267, 270-75 (1986).
54. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 129; see also STEIN, supra note 22, and the references
therein.
55. See, e.g., Glenn H. Snyder, Prisoner'sDilemma and Chicken Models in International Politics, 15 INT'L STUD. Q. 66 (1971); BRAMS, supra note 16, at 26-38; STEIN, supra
note 22, at 31-35. See Abbott, supra note 21, at 360-62 (for additional references on the
subject).
56. See, e.g., STEVE WEBER, COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN U.S.-SOVIET ARMS
CONTROL 17 (1991).

57. See BAIRD ET AL., supranote 14, at 167, 201.
58. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Collective Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The Challenges of InternationalWater Resource Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 384, 389
(1996); CRISTINA BICCHIERI, RATIONALITY AND COORDINATION 224 (1993); William H.
Rodgers, Jr., The Evolution of Cooperation in Natural Resources Law: The
Drifter/HabitueDistinction,38 U. FLA. L. REV. 195, 199-200 (1986).
59. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 110-15 (1978);
Duncan Snidal, Coordinationversus Prisoner's Dilemma: Implications for International
Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 923, 929 (1985) [hereinafter Coordination].
60. Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
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lems, and several authors expressed the view that the logic underlying
the problem of collective action is the logic of the PD. 61 This was a
sweeping generalization. Today, it is clear that the structure of some
collective action problems is different from the structure of the PD.
3.

The Assurance Game

Scholars approaching collective action problems with the tools of
game theory devoted disproportional attention to PD. Nevertheless, all
that attention should not detract from the relevance of other game
structures commonly applied in the international system. While the
Assurance game 62 presents less conflict-driven features than PD, successful collective action remains uncertain. As shown in Figure 3, attaining the optimal outcome in the Assurance game requires cooperation by all players.
Player 2
Player 1

C

C
4,4

D
1,3

D

3,1

2,2

Figure3: The Assurance Game
The preference ordering of the players in the Assurance game is:
CC>DC>DD>CD.
Examination of the above matrix shows that the game has two
Nash equilibriums (CC and DD) and neither dominates the other.
While CC is Pareto superior to the other possibilities, rational players
may reach the equilibrium of DD. A player may play D if he or she is
not certain whether the other will play C or D, and if he or she is determined to avoid the worst outcomes of CD. In such cases, "all hare
risk-dominates all stag."63 Pre-play communication between the players may alleviate the problem in Assurance situations. A rational
61. See, e.g., Russell Hardin, Collective Action as an Agreeable N-Prisoners' Dilemma,
16 BEHAV. SCI. 472 (1971).
62. Rousseau's story of the stag hunt commonly illustrates the Assurance game structure in which two hunters must cooperate in order to catch a stag. If they catch a stag, it
will be shared between the hunters, thus generating the best outcome (CC). If both hunt
for hare, each of them will catch one hare and attain inferior payoffs (DD). The worst result for a hunter arises if he/she attempts to catch the stag while the other hunts for hare
(CD). Here, the second will catch a hare and the first will catch nothing. See FUDENBERG
& TIROLE, supra note 9, at 3; RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 167-68 (1982).

63. FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 9, at 20.
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player is expected to pledge to play C, thus improving the chances that
the other player also will adopt a cooperative strategy. Such communication does not, however, completely eliminate the likelihood of defec64
tion.
In two-player sequential Assurance situations, a player may drive
the other to cooperate in the next move by playing C in the first stage.
A player may also accomplish this by committing to a cooperative strategy in an early stage. The same is true for N-player settings regarding
all the players but the last one. If all players except the last one have
already played C , or committed themselves to cooperate, a last rational
player will cooperate to gain the optimal results of CC.
Attaining optimal results in N-player games is less likely than in
two-player sequential situations. A rational player in N-player games
is aware that the desirable result emerges only if all players cooperate.
Increasing the number of players increases the likelihood that one
player will defect. Subsequently, this decreases a rational player's incentive to cooperate and to take the risk of suffering the worst outcome.
In the iterated game scenario, the prospects for cooperation are fostered. In iterated Assurance games, the gap between the optimal outcomes (CC) and those generated by cautious strategies (DD) grows, increasing the losses from long-term mutual defection. As the gap
increases, the likelihood that a player will take the risk of a cooperative
strategy, thereby encouraging the other player to cooperate, is increased. Contingent strategies, like Tit-for-Tat, generally lead to more
65
cooperative results.
The above analysis demonstrates that a player in Assurance situations will cooperate if assured that the other players will also cooperate.
Therefore, gaining reliable information regarding the players' intentions is crucial to cooperation in Assurance situations. Some scholars
argue that the Assurance game does not constitute a genuine collective
action problem, but rather presents only an "information problem." 66
Lack of information occurs frequently in the international arena. Players are expected to gather information regarding the expected behavior
and expectations of the other players. This task may be realized, wherever possible, through pre-play communication and examination of the
other players' records in similar situations. In iterated situations, the
players also learn about others' intentions through the moves of the
game itself. In sequential cases, the most efficient information64. As observed by Aumann, regardless of his/her own play, player 2 gains more if
player 1 plays C. Thus, no matter what action is intended by player 2, he/she will tell
player 1 that that he/she intends to play C. Player 1, of course, should not be assumed to
believe Player 2. See FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 9, at 21.
65. See, e.g., SANDLER, supra note 1, at 83.
66. Elster, supra note 1, at 140; see also TAYLOR, supranote 3, at 19, 39; STEIN, supra
note 22, at 30.
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gathering strategy for a player is to start with cooperation. 67
Without reliable information, the variables used to determine the
probability of a player adopting a cooperative or noncooperative strategy include: (1) the extent of the gap between CC and DD; (2) the number of remaining stages of the game; (3) the discount rate (in iterated
games); (4) the number of players; and (5) the magnitude of the risk
generated by CD. Increasing the value of the first three variables increases the prospects for cooperative moves, while increasing the number of players and the magnitude associated with CD, decreases the
prospects for cooperative moves.
Scholars have applied the Assurance game to various international
situations in which attaining optimal results required cooperative
moves by all participants. 68 Surprisingly, the model rarely has been
applied to international environmental collective action problems. 69
4.

The Coordination Game

70
As in the Assurance game, all players in the Coordination game
have to cooperate in order to attain the optimal outcome. The central
difference between these two game models is that while the Assurance
game presents only one Pareto-equilibrium position, the Coordination
game presents multiple Pareto-equilibria over which the players have
divergent preferences. The normal form of this problem is presented in
Figure 4.

67. Hugh Ward, Testing the Waters: Taking Risks to Gain Reassurance in Public
Goods Games, 33 J. CONFLICT RES. 274 (1988). In this article, Ward analyzes an Assurance model in which a player is not certain whether the other players have Assurance or
PD preferences.
68. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, Collective Goods, Mobile Resources, and Extraterritorial Trade Controls, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117 (1987); Robert Jervis, From Balanced to Concert: A Study of InternationalSecurity Cooperation, 38 WORLD POL. 58, 67-68
(1985); Carlise Ford Rounge, Institutions and the Free Rider: The Assurance Problem in
Collective Action, 46 J. POL. 154 (1984); STEIN, supra note 22, at 31; Ward, supra note 67,
at 279.
69. See, e.g., SANDLER, supra note 1, at 168.
70. The story of the Coordination game, also known as "The Battle of the Sexes," involves two players who wish to go to an event together but who disagree about whether to
go to a football game or to the ballet. Each player gets a payoff of 2 if both go to his or
her preferred event, a payoff of 1 if both go to the other's preferred event, and 0 payoffs if
they are unable to agree. FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 9, at 18; see also the original
story in LuCE & RAIFFA, supra note 9, at 91.
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Player 2
Player 1

S1

S1
2, 1

S2
0, 0

S2

0,0

1,2

Figure4: CoordinationGame
The preference ordering for player 1 is:
S1, S1 > S2, S2 > S1, S2 = S2, S1
And for player 2:

S2, S2 > S1, S1 > S1, S2 = S2, S1
The Coordination game has two Nash equilibriain pure strategy:
(S1, S1) and (S2, S2). Both strategies are efficient. Each one, however,
generates different payoffs to the players. The players are interested in
coordinating on one of the equilibria positions. The collective action
problem arises since they have conflicting preferences regarding the
71
chosen equilibrium.
This game represents a clear distributional problem, 72 Which impedes cooperation. However, once the players agree on a cooperative
solution, there are no significant incentives to depart from the coordination point, making the solution self-enforcing.7 3 If pre-play communication exists, each rational player may announce that he or she would
follow his or her preferred equilibrium point (e.g., S1 for Player 1),
while the other player, seeking to avoid the worst results (S1, S2), is
driven to the first preferred strategy. 74 Assuming that both players are
rational and adopt this strategy, the above proposition does not aid in
solving the game. On the other hand, in sequential games the first
player to move may have a significant advantage since he or she is able
to commit himself or herself in an earlier stage to the preferred equilibrium position. Meanwhile, the second player has no choice but to join
the first player.
The prospects for cooperation are not necessarily decreased in Nplayer games (as in PD). Indeed, in some cases, the prospects are enhanced. Increasing the number of players impedes communication and

71. For a discussion of situations in which players converge on some "focal point" (a
prominent position in terms of uniqueness, simplicity, or precedency), see THOMAS C.
SHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 69-72, 89, 92 (1960); RASMUSEN, supra note 9, at
28-29.
72. See Coordination, supra note 59, at 931-32; James D. Morrow, Modelling the
Forms of InternationalCooperation: Distribution versus Information, 48 INT'L ORG. 387,
388 (1994) [hereinafter Modelling].
73. Coordination,supra note 59, at 932; STEIN, supranote 22, at 42.
74. LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 9, at 91.
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complicates bargaining, but does not increase the players' incentives to
defect from the equilibrium point. While each player in games with a
small number of players may have an incentive to depart (or threaten to
depart) from the coordination point in an attempt to compel the others
to accept his/her preferred point, the strategy's impact decreases as the
75
number of players increases.
In contrast to PD situations, the iteration of the Coordination game
does not lead to better cooperative results. On the contrary, playing
through time may become one of the destabilizing factors in Coordination situations. The magnitude of the distributional problem corresponds to the extent of the gap between the payoffs generated to the
players in the different equilibria positions. This gap is relatively small
in a one-shot game (i.e., 1 in Figure 4), but it increases together with
the iteration of the game. Thus, a player willing to give up the relatively small additional benefit of his or her preferred equilibrium, in order to avoid the worst results, would find it more difficult as the gap
grows with each iteration of the game.7 6 The discount factor's impact
upon the prospects for cooperation is very different from that in the PD.
Decreasing the discount rate to zero in the Coordination game brings
the players closer to the one-shot games. The decrease in the discount
rate reduces future losses arising from compromise on the unfavorable
equilibrium point. Therefore, decreasing the discount rate encourages
the players to cooperate.
Players in Coordination situations are expected to misrepresent
their private information. They are likely to attempt to convince the
others that adopting their preferred equilibrium position will also further their own interests (i.e., that the situation is similar to the Assurance game). Players in Coordination situations have incentive to dissemble information; conceal or underrate unfavorable information, and
exaggerate favorable data. Increasing the gap between the different
equilibria positions enhances the distributional problem and intensifies
the information problem. When the players do not trust messages conveyed by the other players, the likelihood of successful coordination is
77
reduced.
The Coordination game captures the essence of numerous collective
action situations, in which several ways of attaining optimal results
exist. The Coordination game is applied to various international contexts where the actors are interested in "meeting" each other in some
coordinated position but have conflicting preferences over the particular
meeting point. The prominent examples in the international arena include setting common standards for international communication,

75. Coordination,supra note 59, at 935-36.
76. Coordination,supra note 59, at 936. See also Modelling, supra note 72, at 411.
77. Modelling, supra note 72, at 400-06.
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agreeing on radio-emergency frequency for civil aviation, and formulating an international system for the classification of goods for customs
78
purposes.
III.

GAME THEORY AND ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION IN THE MIDDLE
EAST

A.

The Prospectsfor EnvironmentalCooperation: Game Theoretical
Analysis

Having clarified the central notions and models of game theory,
this article now turns to an examination of the major environmental
problems in the Middle East. This Part analyzes two of the region's
principal environmental problems: marine pollution in the Gulf of
Aqaba and water contamination of the Mountain Aquifer. This section
will also briefly discuss other regional environmental problems.
1.

Marine Pollution in the Gulf of Aqaba
a.

Background

The Gulf of Aqaba ("Gulf') is one of two northern extensions of the Red
Sea, the other being the Gulf of Suez. The Gulf extends about 180 km
from the Israeli and Jordanian shores in the north to the Strait of Tiran
in the South, bordering the coastlines of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. It is
both narrow, with an average width of only 18 km, and deep, with an
average depth of 800 meters. The water in the Gulf is calm and the
winds generally come from the north. The water is exceptionally clear,
due to a very low concentration of nutrients and plankton. The Gulfs
natural features create ideal conditions for an abundant and diverse
aquatic system. At the heart of the ecosystem are the Gulfs worldrenowned and exquisite coral reefs, which are home to myriad aquatic
79
life forms.
The four littoral states of the Gulf of Aqaba are Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Aside from the intrinsic environmental value of
78. For more situations presenting the features of the Coordination game, see STEIN,
supra note 22, at 42-43; Abbott, supra note 21, at 371-72, 374; Coordination,supra note
59, at 932; Modelling, supra note 72, at 390-93, 409-13.
79. Khalil Hosny Mancy, Gulf of Aqaba Ecological Overview and Call to Action, in
PROTECTING THE GULF OF AQABA 19 (Deborah Sandler et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter
PROTECTING THE GULF OF AQABA]; A REGIONAL PROJECT BETWEEN EGYPT, ISRAEL, AND
JORDAN: UPPER GULF OF AQABA OIL SPILL CONTINGENCY PROJECT 4, 6 (Eur. Comm'n, DG

I B, External Relations, Brussels, 1995) [hereinafter UPPER GULF OF AQABA]; Grant
James Hewison & Boaz Oren, ProtectingSensitive Aquatic Habitats in the Gulf of Aqaba,
in PROTECTING THE GULF OF AQABA , supra, at 119.
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its unique ecosystem, there are two principal reasons why the Gulf is of
80
considerable importance to Egypt, Israel, and Jordan:
The first is that the Gulf is an important transportation route for
Jordan and Israel, and to a lesser degree, for Egypt. The Port of Aqaba
is Jordan's only outlet to the sea, and the Port of Eilat is Israel's only
gateway to the East. The regular ferry traffic inside the Gulf, between
Nuweiba in Egypt and Aqaba, serves tourists and Egyptian workers in
neighboring countries. Cargo traffic to Aqaba, as well as cargo and
crude oil traffic to Eilat, dominates the maritime traffic in the Gulf. In
1993, the Port of Aqaba received 1,430 of the 1,615 vessels entering the
Gulf through the Strait of Tiran. Oil tankers carrying crude oil from
Egypt make up approximately one-third of the ship's calls to Eilat.8 1
The second reason is that the Gulf harbors several very popular
tourist destinations, including unique coral reefs. The reefs attract a
significant number of tourists from around the world. Israel and Jordan maintain large tourist resorts, mainly in Eilat and Aqaba. However, some facilities are found along the Egyptian coast (mainly in
Taba, Nueiba, and Dahab). All three States continue to expand their
existing resorts, rapidly making tourism the major source of employ82
ment and income in the area.
The Gulfs precious environmental resources, maritime transportation and tourist industry are interrelated. While environmental pollution rarely affects maritime transportation, maritime transportation,
and activities associated with it do affect the waters. For instance, acCidents during cargo loading and unloading or crude oil terminal operations can have a significant impact on the Gulfs extremely fragile environmental resources. Furthermore, the success of the area's tourist
industry largely depends upon the quality of the coast's environmental
resources since most tourists engage in water activities like swimming,
diving, and snorkeling. Ironically, however, the tourist industry re83
mains one of the principal sources of marine pollution in the Gulf.

80. The Gulf is of lesser importance to Saudi Arabia. There are only a few small
towns on the Saudi Arabian coast, and it seems that the government is not interested in
developing tourist resorts in the area.
81. UPPER GULF OF AQABA, supra note 79, at 8.

82. See Roy B. Mann, Tourism and Related Development Compatible with Aesthetic
Resource Protection in the Gulf of Aqaba, in PROTECTING THE GULF OF AQABA, supra note

79, at 143; Fouad Sultan, Tourism Development Along the Gulf of Aqaba Coast: An Egyptian Perspective, in PROTECTING THE.GULF OF AQABA, supra note 79, at 177; UPPER GULF

OFAQABA, supra note 79, at 8-9.
83. On the sources of pollution in the Gulf, see Zihad Jaber Alawneh, JordanianEnvironmental Laws, Institutions, and Treaties Affecting the Gulf of Aqaba, in PROTECTING
THE GULF OF AQABA, supra note 79, at 97, 98-102; Deborah Sandler, Environmental Law
and Policy for the Gulf of Aqaba: An Israeli Perspective, in PROTECING THE GULF OF

AQABA, supra note 79, at 69, 85-89; Mohammed I. Wahbeh, An Agenda for Scientific Research in the Gulf of Aqaba, in PROTECTING THE GULF OF AQABA, supra note 79, at 25, 28-

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 27:1

The Gulf of Aqaba area is undergoing a wave of economic development, a fact which poses significant risk to its fragile environmental resources. This is particularly true because the current utilization of the
region's resources borders its carrying capacity. Given this state of affairs, any significant pollution is expected to generate harmful results
to the Gulf ecosystem and, consequently, to the tourist industry.
b.

Analysis: Israel and Jordan

Significant pollution originating from either Israel or Jordan generates similar negative payoffs for both parties. This is due to the geographic proximity of the two States' coasts and the marine pollution
frequently generated in the Gulf by events close to shore, like mooring
operations in the harbors, oil unloading, or sewage disposal.8 4 Large
amounts of pollutants originating from either State will first harm the
coastal ecosystem of the originating State, and several hours later, the
environmental resources of the neighboring State. An oil spill can drift
from Jordan to Israel or from Israel to Jordan within six hours. 85 This
type of pollution, especially if repeated, would significantly harm both
parties' vital tourist industry.
To simplify the game theory analysis, assume that each party has
two principal strategies, C and D. C refers to a cooperative strategy in
which a party takes the appropriate preventive measures to avoid marine pollution, while D refers to a non-cooperative strategy in which a
party does not take the required preventive measures. Significant pollution occurs if one of the parties defects (CD or DC). Pollution is
avoided if both parties cooperate (CC), while serious pollution occurs if
both parties adopt non-cooperative strategies (DD). Several assumptions enable the presentation of the parties' ordinal payoffs in a normal
form (Figure 6). First, preventive costs are lower than the benefits generated by utilizing non-polluted environmental resources. Second, the
preventive costs and the positive payoffs in the absence of pollution are
similar for both parties. Finally, the worst possibility for each party is
to take precautionary measures while still suffering the negative payoffs resulting from pollution.

31.
84. The likelihood of ship collision leading to major spills in the Gulf is remote. See
UPPER GULF OF AQABA, supra note 79, at 10-11.
85. UPPER GULF OF AQABA, supra note 79, at 21.

1998

GAME THEORY

Jordan
Israel
D

C
4,4

D

3,1

2,2

1,3

Figure 6: Ordinalpayoff matrix for Jordanand
Israel in the Gulf of Aqaba
Thus, the preference ordering for Israel and Jordan in this setting
is:
CC > DC > DD > CD86
The structure of the interactive sub-setting between Jordan and Israel is that of the Assurance game and the attainment of the optimal
outcome (CC) requires both parties to adopt cooperative strategies.
This situation presents two Nash equilibria (CC and DD), but neither
dominates the other. While CC equilibrium is clearly Pareto superiorto
DD, a rational actor cooperates only if inclined to believe that the other
party will cooperate. Since the Gulf of Aqaba system presents an infinite iterated situation, the gap between the optimal and worst results
grows, thereby fostering the prospects for mutual cooperation. The discount rates of Israel and Jordan are relatively high. The fact that both
parties currently invest considerable resources in developing their regional tourist industries testifies to that effect. This factor increases
the likelihood that both parties' strategies will converge on the mutual
cooperative equilibrium.
The Assurance game's characteristics explain why Israel and Jordan have adopted the current cooperative strategies in the Gulf, leading
to stable cooperation. In this sub-setting, a party generally departs
from its cooperative strategy only if it expects that the other party will
adopt a non-cooperative strategy. Thus, for instance, Jordan is expected to forgo its preventive measures if convinced that Israel is likely
to refrain from adopting the required precautionary measures. Here,
Jordan avoids the worst outcome of incurring both the preventive costs
and the expected harmful results from significant pollution by "defecting" in advance. Information regarding the other party's expected behavior plays a vital role in such situations.

86. In CC, a party bears the preventive costs and benefits from utilizing Gulf resources in the absence of pollution. In DC, a party does not incur the preventive costs but
sustains the damages arising from significant marine pollution. In DD, a party does not
bear the preventive costs but suffers the harmful results generated by serious pollution.
In CD, a party incurs the preventive costs and sustains the damages arising from significant pollution.
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Egypt, Israel, and Jordan

The structure of the environmental setting between Egypt, Jordan,
and Israel differs from that of only Israel and Jordan. Egypt, like Israel
and Jordan, maintains a significant interest in sustaining and developing its tourist industry along the Gulf coast. The basic difference between the two settings derives from the geographic location of the parties and the circulation patterns within the Gulf. The prevailing winds
are from north to south and the currents run from Jordan and Israel
southward to the Egyptian coast. Thus, while pollutants from Jordan
or Israel can travel to Egypt within 12 hours,87 most pollutants from
Egypt are not expected to even reach either Jordan or Israel.
Though significant pollution originating from the Egyptian coast is
unlikely to pollute Israeli or Jordanian coasts, it may well cause some
harm to other southern Egyptian coasts. The negative effects on other
Egyptian coasts change in accordance with the location of the pollution's source. Pollutants originating in the northern Egyptian coasts
(e.g., Taba) are likely to harm the originating coast, and then travel
southward, inflicting environmental damage on the Egyptian coastal
resorts in the south (e.g., Dahab). Pollutants originating in the southern coasts (e.g., Ras Nasrani), will travel southwards to the Red Sea
and are not likely to harm other Egyptian coastal resorts. Thus, the
further south the pollution's source, the greater is Egypt's externalization rate.
Externalization changes according to the geographic location of the
pollution's source, generating different payoff structures for various
Egyptian coasts. To simplify, the payoff structures of two representative cases are examined below: (a) the source of pollution is on Egypt's
northern coast; and (b) the source of pollution is on Egypt's southern
coast. The similar interests of Israel and Jordan vis-a-vis Egypt enable
the insertion of either one as a player in the following matrices. The
assumption is that Israel and Jordan converge on the same position, either CC or DD, supra. Employing the same assumptions and notations
as in Figure 6, the normal form of the parties' ordinal payoffs for pollution originating in the northern Egyptian coast is presented in Figure 7.

87. UPPER GULF OFAQABA, supra note 79, at 21.
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Figure 7: Ordinal payoff matrix for pollution originating from Egypt's northern coasts.
Two prominent features arise from this matrix. First, from Israel
or Jordan's point of view, Egypt's strategy will not affect their behavior.
Israel or Jordan will cooperate as long as the other cooperates, regardless of whether Egypt cooperates. Under the present circumstances,
CC > DD is true for both Israel and Jordan. Thus, C is the dominant
strategy for each of them. Second, since Egypt is aware that C is the
dominant strategy for Israel and Jordan, and since CC > DC for Egypt,
C is also the dominant strategy for Egypt.88 Egypt's preference ordering
in this case reflects the Assurance game. If Jordan or Israel changes its
current strategy and adopts a non-cooperative approach, D becomes the
dominant strategy for Egypt (DD > CD for Egypt).
As one moves southward down the Egyptian coast, Egypt can externalize more of its pollutants to the Red Sea, thus changing the relationship between CC and DC. While it is clear that CC > DC remains
true for pollution originating from northern coasts, the gap decreases as
one moves southward. At some "critical point," CC will be equal to DD.
When crossing the "critical point" on Egypt's southern coasts, DC becomes greater than CC. Figure 8 sets forth the normal form of the parties' ordinal payoffs for marine pollution originating from Egypt's southern coasts:
Egypt
Israel/Jordan

C

D

C

4,3

4,4

D

2,1

2,2

Figure 8. Ordinalpayoff matrix for pollution
originatingin Egypt's southern coasts

88. In CC, Egypt bears the preventive costs and benefits from utilizing the Gulf in
the absence of pollution. In DC, Egypt does not incur the preventive costs but sustains the
damage arising from significant marine pollution on the southern coasts. In DD, Egypt
does not bear the preventive costs but suffers the harmful results generated by serious
pollution. In CD, Egypt incurs the preventive costs and sustains the damage arising from
significant pollution.
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Egypt's ordering preference in this case is as follows:
DC > CC > DD > CD
In contrast to pollution originating from Egypt's northern coasts,
Egypt's optimal combination in the present case is CD. Egypt's ordering preferences reflect the Prisoner's Dilemma structure. Jordan and
Israel's positions, however, remain the same as for pollution originating
in Egypt's northern coasts (Assurance preferences between themselves).
In this case, C is still the dominant strategy for Israel and Jordan.
Egypt, knowing their preference ordering, is expected to adopt its optimal strategy (DC), choosing not to invest significant resources to prevent pollution originating from its southern coasts. 89 Israel and Jordan
will not be affected by Egypt's non-cooperative strategy and are not expected to press the latter to take preventive measures. Furthermore,
even if Israel and Jordan threaten to employ retaliatory measures
against Egypt for pollution originating from Egypt's southern coasts,
such threats will be considered "noncredible"90 and are unlikely to persuade Egypt to divert from its expected strategy. Clearly, the equilibrium resulting from the above matrix does not favor the protection of
the environmental resources in the southern part of the Gulf.91
d.

Future Development and the Need for Common Standards

Current utilization of the Gulfs resources stretches the limits of its
environmental carrying capacity. As the three coastal States launch
various projects to expand their tourist industries, the risk of overloading the region's natural resources remains acute, while the need for
greater coordination increases. The seeds of cooperation already exist
in the recent "Upper Gulf of Aqaba Oil Spill Contingency Project,"92 but
much more is needed to counter the expected environmental degradation.
Further measures should set common and more stringent standards for sewage discharge, (particularly industrial), prevention of
leaks and spills from port facilities, and reduction of emissions of airborne chemicals like phosphates, potash, and bromide. There should be
common rules to prevent dumping of wastes from private boats and for
89. Egypt externalizes its pollution from the southern coasts. It is possible that
Egypt's relationships with the other coastal states outside the Gulf of Aqaba (in the Red
Sea) will be similar to those in the Prisoner's Dilemma. That subject, however, exceeds
the limits of this study.
90. As explained above, a player is not expected to take into account non-credible
threats, i.e., threats that if carried out, cost more to the player who issues them than if
they are not carried out. See discussion supra Part II.C(2).
91. Some methods to modify the current structure of settings susceptible to collective
action failure will be dealt with, infra, in Part III.B.
92. See UPPER GULF OF AQABA, supra note 79, at 18-23; Ministry of the Environment,
Upper Gulf of Aqaba Oil Spill Contingency Project, 18 ISR. ENVTL. BULL. 10 (1995).
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the establishment of adequate port facilities to collect these wastes. 93
Establishing common standards is expected to generate an interactive
situation characterized by the Coordination game's features, a subject
dealt with later in Part III(C).
2.

Water Contamination of the Mountain Aquifer
a.

Background

Water is essential for survival and economic development in the
semi-arid climate of the Middle East, and this is one of the scarcest resources in the region. According to water experts, Jordan, Israel, and
the Palestinians are much below the "Water Stress Level" of 500 cubic
meters per person per year. 94 Not surprisingly, the parties in the region
have struggled fiercely over control and allocation of this precious and
95
scarce resource.
The Mountain Aquifer represents the largest water resource in the
region, supplying 600 million cubic meters of water per year ("MCMY").
The Aquifer supplies approximately a third of Israel's annual water
consumption and 90% of the Palestinians' consumption. The underground reservoir lies beneath the West Bank's mountains in the central
part of the mountain ridge. The Aquifer consists of three major basins:
the Yarkon Taninim basin (360 MCMY), the Nablus-Gilboa basin (140
MCMY), and the Eastern basin (100 MCMY). Of the 600 MCMY from
the entire Aquifer, Israel and its Jewish settlements in the area use
about 495 MCMY, while the Palestinians use about 105 MCMY.96

93. In addition, a reduction in the number of active ports and marinas will save resources and enable better supervision over the port facilities which constitute a source of
frequent pollution in the Gulf. Thus, the proposal to close Eilat Port and the proposal
that the Aqaba Port will serve both Jordan and Israel may well lead to desirable results.
See Dany Morgenstern, Implementing Jordanian Option, GREEN-BLUE-WHITE J. ENVTL.
PROTECTION IN ISR. 8, 10-11 (Jan-Feb. 1995) (in Hebrew).
94. Hillel I. Shuval, Approaches to Resolving the Water Conflicts between Israel and
her Neighbors: A Regional Water-for-PeacePlan, 17 WATER INT'L 133 (1992).
95. For a discussion on the history of the struggle over the allocation of water among
the Middle Eastern States, see KATHRYN B. DOHERTY, JORDAN WATERS CONFLICT 3
(1965); MIRIAM R. LOWI, WATER AND POWER: THE POLITICS OF A SCARCE RESOURCE IN THE
JORDAN RIVER BASIN 79-203 (1993); J. W. Eaton & D. J. Eaton, Water Utilization in the
Yarmuk-Jordan, 1192-1992, in WATER AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 93 (J. Isaac & H.
Shuval eds., 1994) [hereinafter WATER AND PEACE]; Aaron Wolf & John Ross, The Impact
of Scarce Water Resources on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 919, 926-48
(1992); Aaron Wolf, Water for Peace in the JordanRiver Watershed, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J.
797, 799-806 (1993).
96. Eyal Benvenisti & Haim Gvirtzman, HarnessingInternationalLaw to Determine
Israeli-PalestinianWater Rights: The Mountain Aquifer, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 543, 55059 (1993); Haim Gvirtzman, Groundwater Allocation in Judea and Samaria, in WATER
AND PEACE, supra note 95, at 205, 208-14. A slightly different assessment of the issue
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Two central terms need definition before continuing the article.
First, the feeding area is the surface area composed of permeable rock
outcrops through which both rainwater and pollutants can penetrate
the aquifer. Second, the storage area is that part of the aquifer where
surface rocks are impermeable, serving as a "roof' covering the groundwater reservoir. Pumping water from the storage area is stable and
cheap, and most of the wells pumping water from the Aquifer are in this
area. The majority of the Mountain Aquifer's feeding area is outside Israel's pre-1967 borders, and is predominantly inhabited by Palestinians. However, a greater amount of the Aquifer's water volume is con97
tained within Israel's 1967 borders.
The physical properties of the particular aquifer determine its
groundwater vulnerability to pollution. 98 The "DRASTIC" model, developed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, assesses an aquifer's sensitivity to contamination using seven factors. 99 In light of the
Mountain Aquifer's importance to the region, it is surprising that no
one, using either DRASTIC or any other model, has completed a comprehensive assessment of the Mountain Aquifer's vulnerability to contamination. The available information regarding some of the DRASTIC
central factors indicates, however, that most of the Aquifer remains
highly vulnerable to anthropogenic pollution. For one, the Aquifer's
hydraulic conductivity is relatively high. 100 The aquifer media includes

appears in Hillel I. Shuval, Geopolitical Aspects of Shared Aquifers: A Case Study of a
Conflict, in GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION AND CONTROL 661 (Uri Zoller ed., 1994). See
also Hillel I. Shuval, ProposedPrinciples and Methodology for the Equitable Allocation of
the Water Resources Shared by the Israelis, Palestinians,Jordanians,Lebanese and Syrians, in WATER AND PEACE, supra note 95, at 481-86 (discussing the same issue); Wolf &
Ross, supra note 95, at 924-25. For a more meticulous analysis of the structure of the Aquifer's sub-basins, see Dror Avisar, The Impact of Pollutantsfrom Anthropogenic Sources
within a Hydrologically Sensitive Area; the Wadi Rabba 44 (1996) (in Hebrew).
97. Gvirtzman, supra note 96, at 208, 212-13; Benvenisti & Gvirtzman, supra note
96, at 552-57.
98. Yehuda Bachmat and Martin Collin define groundwater vulnerability to pollution
as "the sensitivity of its quality to anthropogenic activities which may prove detrimental
to the present and/or intended usage-value of the resource." Yehuda Bachmat & Martin
Collin, Mapping to Assess Groundwater Vulnerability to Pollution, in VULNERABILITY OF
SOIL AND GROUNDWATER TO POLLUTANTS 3, 297 (W. van Duijvenbooden & H. G. van Waegeningh eds., 1987).
99. D.R.A.S.T.I.C. refers to the initial of each factor: Depth to water table, Recharge
amount, Aquifer media, Soil media, Topography, Impact of the vadose zone, and Conductivity of the aquifer.
See LINDA ALLER, DRASTIC: A STANDARDIZED SYSTEM FOR
EVALUATING GROUND WATER POLLUTION POTENTIAL USING HYDROGEOLOGIC SETrINGS
14-22 (1985); see also Sara Secunda, et al., Composite DRASTIC Land-Use Vulnerability
Assessment of Groundwater in Israel's Sharon Region Utilizing GIS Technology 4, in
HYDROLOGICAL REPORT 1996 (Water Comm'n Hydrological Serv. & Ministry of the Env't,
1996).
100. BOYKO ET AL., UNDERGROUND WATER CONTAMINATION POTENTIAL IN WESTERN
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many cracks and fractions, which create "short-cuts" through the geologic system, 10 1 while the soil media consists of primarily limestone and
dolomite rock formations, allowing rapid infiltration of the soil by vari102
ous pollutants.
The three principal sources of water pollution within the Mountain
Aquifer include, in order of their polluting impact: domestic, industrial,
and agricultural pollution. 0 3 An inadequate infrastructure for treating
wastewater in the inhabited parts above the aquifer is responsible for
most of the domestic wastewater10 4 The population in this area includes approximately 1,121,900 Palestinians and 133, 200 Israeli settlers. 0 5 Most Palestinian cities and rural areas do not have adequate
wastewater collection or treatment systems.10 6 On the other hand, most

SAMARIA 33 (1993) (in Hebrew, summary in English); Haim Gvirtzman, The Hydrology of
Judea and Samaria, in JUDEA AND SAMARIA RESEARCH STUDIES-PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING 269, 278 (1995) (in Hebrew, summary in English) [hereinafter

Hydrology]; Haim Gvirtzman et al., Water Reservoirson the Western Slopes of Samariafor
Preventing Floods in the Dan Region, in JUDEA AND SAMARIA RESEARCH STUDIESPROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING 315, 325 (1994) (in Hebrew, summary in

English) [hereinafter Water Reservoirs].
101. V. RUDESKY ET AL., GROUNDWATER POLLUTION HAZARDS FROM THE BARKAN
INDUSTRIAL ZONE 11 (The Geological Survey of Israel, 1993) (in Hebrew).
102. V. Rudesky, The Impact of Barkan Industrial Zone Wastewater on Groundwater
Quality, in

JUDEA AND

SAMARIA RESEARCH STUDIES-PROCEEDINGS

OF THE FOURTH

ANNUAL MEETING, supra note 100, at 328; Gvirtzman, Hydrology, supra note 100, at 26970.
103. See generally JEAN J. FRIED, GROUNDWATER POLLUTION 1 (1975) and UNITED
STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GROUNDWATER HANDBOOK 97 (2d ed.,

1992) (discussing sources of groundwater pollution in general).
104. Feitelson and Abdul-Jaber state in their joint study that "[m]ost of the sewage
generated in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, by Jews and Arabs alike, is not treated.
Moreover, much of it flows over aquifer recharge areas." ERAN FEITELSON & QASEM
HASSAN ABDUL-JABER, PROSPECTS FOR ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN
COOPERATION IN
WASTEWATER TREATMENT AND RE-USE IN THE JERUSALEM REGION 1 (1997).

105. Central Bureau of Statistics, Pub. No. 573, Statistical Abstract of Israel-1996, at
55 (1996).
106. See Jad Isaac et al., The PalestinianEnvironmental Dilemma 14 (International
Conference on Ecological Development in the Middle East Paper, Feb. 7-14,
1995) [hereinafter Dilemma]; ISRAEL-PALESTINE
CENTER
FOR RESEARCH
AND
INFORMATION, Workshop Session: Water Quality in Israel's Central District and the West
Bank, in OUR SHARED ENVIRONMENT: THE 1995 CONFERENCE 67, at 72-73 (Robin Twite &
Robin Menczel eds., 1996). See THE APPLIED RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF JERUSALEM (ARIJ),
ENVIRONMENTAL PROFILE FOR THE WEST BANK: HEBRON DISTRICT 55 (1995) [hereinafter
ARIJ, HEBRON DISTRICT]; ARIJ, ENVIRONMENTAL PROFILE FOR THE WEST BANK:
BETHLEHEM DISTRICT 46-49 (1995) [hereinafter ARIJ, BETHLEHEM DISTRICT] and 24 THE
BIOSPHERE 26 (No. 3-4, Dec.-Jan. 1994-95) (in Hebrew), for a discussion on the situation
in the Palestinian cities of Hebron and Bethlehem. Most of the Palestinian rural population and the inhabitants in the refugee camps dispose their wastewater into cesspits, septic tanks, absorption pits and open sewage channels. When these installations fill up, the
raw wastes are disposed into the open wadis and fields. This wastewater directly infil-
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Israeli settlements in this area have some collection systems, but in
many the wastewater is dumped into the surrounding wadis and open

fields. 107
Agricultural activities above the Mountain Aquifer also harm its
water quality, largely due to extensive utilization of agrochemicals, pesticides, fertilizers, and fluents for irrigation.1 08 A significant part of the
resident Palestinian population (about 50%) benefits directly from the
intense agricultural activities undertaken in the area. l0 9 Farmers cultivating lands above the Aquifer regularly use agrochemicals. As a result, some underground contamination has already been traced. 110 In
addition, the rural population above the Aquifer uses untreated sewage
for irrigation, threatening the reservoir's water quality."'
Information on industrial pollution is scarce. Water experts consider factories owned by the Israeli population (especially in the Barkan
industrial zone) the principal sources of industrial pollution." 2 The Israeli factories generate wastewater, some of which includes heavy metals and other dangerous substances. Many of the Israeli factories dump
the wastewater into the wadis. 113 There are some Palestinian factories

trates the aquifer or is carried into the water reservoir by the rain; ARIJ, BETHLEHEM
DISTRICT, id. at 46-49. See also Mohammed Said AI-Hamaidi, PalestinianPolicy and Regional EnvironmentalCooperation,PALESTINE-ISRAEL J. 15, 16-17 (1998).
107. BoYKO ET AL., supra note 100, at 3. See, e.g., on Barkan settlement, Avisar, supra
note 96, at 13-15. Some settlements have established purification installations but many
of them are poorly maintained, see, e.g., Avisar, supra note 96, at 13-15; THE BIOSPHERE,
supra note 106, at 29; Workshop Session: Water Quality in Israel'sCentral District and the
West Bank, id. at 72-73 (regarding the El-Kana settlement).
108. See, e.g., Lea Muszkat, Groundwater Quality: Problems and Solutions, in OUR
SHARED-ENVIRONMENT: THE 1994 CONFERENCE 70 (Robin Twite & Robin Menczel eds.,
1995) [hereinafter THE 1994 CONFERENCE].
109. Agriculture accounts for 20 to 30% of the Palestinian GDP and the population's
employment, see THE WORLD BANK, DEVELOPING THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: AN
INVESTMENT IN PEACE 1 (1993) [hereinafter DEVELOPING THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES];
Issac et al., Dilemma, supra note 106, at 5, 7-8; Jad Issac, Sustainable Development and
the Palestinians,in THE 1994 CONFERENCE, id at 33, 36 and Jad Issac, Environmental
Protection and Sustainable Development in Palestine, in OUR COMMON ENVIRONMENT
7,15 (Robin Twite & Jad Issac eds., 1994).
110. Karen Assaf, Palestinian Water Resources-Water Quality, in OUR COMMON
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 109, at 279, 291-92; Issac et al., Dilemma, supra note 106, at 710; Said Assaf, Overview of Some TraditionalAgriculturalPractices Used by Palestinians
in the Protection of the Environment, in THE 1994 CONFERENCE, supra note 108, at 17.
111. See ARIJ, BETHLEHEM DISTRICT, supra note 106, at 49 and ARIJ, HEBRON
DISTRICT, supra note 106, at 57.
112. See BOYKO ET AL., supra note 100, at 25; Interview with Professor Hillel
Shouval, Department of Environmental Studies, at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem
(July 3, 1997) [hereinafter Shouval interview]; Interview with Dr. Stuart Wollman, Department of Environmental Studies, at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (July 4, 1997)
[hereinafter Wollman interview].
113. See Avisar, supra note 96, at 15; BOYKO ET AL., supra note 100, at 21-25 and
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that generate industrial wastewater, particularly in the tanning and
stonecutting industries, which is not pre-treated and is disposed of in a
4
central network of cesspits.1
b.

Analysis

The Palestinian Authority ("PA") currently controls only a small
portion of the lands located over the Mountain Aquifer, though its jurisdiction is expected to expand significantly. Here, the central question concerns the prospects for Israeli-Palestinian cooperation once the
PA gains control over a substantial part of the West Bank. Analyzing
the prospects for cooperation in order to avoid water contamination requires an examination of two principal factors: (1) each party's positive
payoffs from the use of uncontaminated water and (2) the negative payoffs associated with the implementation of the required preventive
measures.
In terms of the latter, it is plain that the Palestinians hold the
brunt of the burden. For the most part, avoiding contamination of the
Aquifer involves an investment designed to prevent the infiltration of
domestic wastewater into the underground reservoir. This requires the
establishment of an adequate infrastructure for collecting and treating
sewage. The financial resources needed to establish the system depends upon the number of people residing in the area. As noted above,
almost 90% of the population in the area is Palestinian. According to
experts, the required investment in an adequate sewage system in the
West Bank is approximately $500 per person, which amounts to more
than $600 million for the entire project.11 5 With Palestinians making
up almost 90% of the population, they would incur the greater share of
the costs.
The Palestinians would also incur the greater share of costs associated with preventive measures against water contamination resulting
from agricultural activities. Palestinian farmers perform most of the
agricultural activities in this area. Agriculture plays a greater role in
the Palestinian economy than in the Israeli economy." 6 Consequently,

Rudesky, supra note 102, at 25.
114. See ARIJ, HEBRON DISTRICT, supra note 106, at 54-55 and ARIJ, BETHLEHEM

DISTRICT, supra note 106, at 46.
115. Shouval interview, supranote 112.
116. 2.9% of the employed population in Israel works in the agricultural sector, which
contributes about 4% to the Israeli GDP. See ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF PRODUCTIVITY,
PRODUCTIVITY IN ISRAEL: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
62 (1997)
[hereinafter
PRODUCTIVITY IN ISRAEL]; DEVELOPING THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, supra note 109, at

57. Agriculture accounts for 20 to 30% of the Palestinian GDP and employment. See supra text accompanying note 109. It is expected that the share of the agricultural sector in
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the Palestinians' investment in the required preventive measures related to agricultural activities would be higher than the Israelis' investment.
Currently, industrial operations constitute the smallest source of
water pollution in the Mountain Aquifer. Yet the detrimental effects of
industrial operations may grow over the next decade. At present, most
of the polluting factories in the area are Israeli owned. Under the current analysis, Israel would bear the greater share of preventive costs
associated with industrial discharges. However, care should be taken
not to overestimate these numbers, as industrial operations in this area
constitute only a small share of Israel's overall industry. In addition,
anticipated industrialization in the territories under the PA's jurisdiction suggests that the present allocation of preventive costs in the industrial sphere may increase, thus increasing the Palestinian's share of
those costs.
An overall assessment of the parties' negative payoffs resulting
from the implementation of the required preventive measures shows
that the Palestinians would incur substantially more expenses than the
Israelis. The gap is considerable with respect to the vast resources
needed for the establishment of an adequate sewage system to avoid
domestic pollution, and less substantial (but still significant) regarding
agricultural pollution. At the moment, the Israelis would bear more
preventive costs for industrial pollution.
One can estimate the positive payoffs generated to the parties from
using uncontaminated water by examining the expected damage to each
party from pollution of the Aquifer. Significant discharge of pollutants
into the reservoir by either party will generate negative payoffs for
both, since both parties share the same pool. The pollutants in the underground reservoir know no political boundaries. This does not mean
that the positive payoffs generated to the parties from using uncontaminated water are the same.
Comparison of the quantities of water used by the parties does not
lead to a clear answer. Indeed, two important factors lead to different
conclusions. On the one hand, the fact that Israel's share in the Aquifer's waters is much greater than the Palestinians (currently 5:1) suggests that significant water pollution in the Aquifer will entail greater
negative payoffs to the Israelis than to Palestinians. On the other
hand, the Aquifer supplies 90% of the Palestinian annual consumption
and only about a third of Israel's consumption. This indicates that the

the Palestinian economy will decrease in the future, together with the processes of agricultural industrialization. In light of the current major role of agriculture in the Palestinian economic life, however, we may well anticipate that its share in the GDP will be
much greater than the Israeli's share over the next decades.
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loss sustained by Palestinians following a significant contamination will
be larger than the loss sustained by Israel. Analysis of the timeframe
in which the harmful results are anticipated and the parties' discount
rates regarding such future losses, reveals asymmetric preferences.
It is precisely known how long it will take from the pollution's discharge until the Aquifer's extracted waters exhibit significant detrimental effects. Water experts claim this period will vary from several years
to several decades in most cases of pollution.11 7 The time interval introduces an important variable of the parties' discount rate regarding
future losses. The discount factor has a major influence upon a party's
willingness to cooperate in infinite iterated games.' 18 The utilization of
the Mountain Aquifer constitutes an infinite iterated situation,11 9 and
the economic resources available to the parties affect their respective
discount rates. As Brown-Weiss observes in her book, "In Fairness to
Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony and
Intergenerational Equity," poor communities are not inclined to cooperate to secure future environmental gains and "desperate actors" are
1 20
more predisposed to adopt short-term strategies.
Recent economic data shows that Israel is considered a developed
State, while the Palestinians are considered a developing nation. 121 In
light of the considerable and pressing problems of unemployment and
poverty faced by the Palestinian Authority,1 22 it is clear that the Palestinians' discount rate regarding water contamination, expected to occur
within several years to decades, is quite low. The situation in the Gaza
Strip exemplifies the Palestinians' loW discount rate regarding future
water sources. Over-exploitation of the aquifer in the Gaza Strip,
where one of the poorest communities in the Middle East lives, has led

117. Wollman interview, supra note 112; Interviews with Dr. Yehuda Bachmat, Israel
Hydrological Service (Sept. 25, 1996) and Dr. Dror Gilad, Israel Hydrological Service (Jul.
3, 1997). See also Karen Assaf, supra note 110, at 291.
118. On the role of the discount rate in infinite games, see supra Part II.C(2-4).
119. The Aquifer is replenishable and allows infinite utilization. A persistent extraction beyond the replenishment rate, however, will terminate its existence. In the latter
case, the structure of the setting will be similar to a zero-sum game.
120. EDITH BROWN-WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL
LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY. AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 162-63 (2d ed. 1989). See
generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS

FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) (discussing common-pool resources and ways that they
can be organized to avoid excessive consumption and administrative costs).
121. In 1992, the Israeli's annual GDP per capita was estimated at $16,600 while the
Palestinian's annual GDP per capita was approximately $1700. See SHARIF S. ELMUSA,
INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES, NEGOTIATING WATER: ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS
22-23 (1996); The Palestinian Economy, PALESTINE-ISRAEL J. 106-07 (1998); and
PRODUCTIVITY IN ISRAEL: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supranote 116, at 82.
122. See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, BACKGROUND NOTE ON THE ECONOMY 1-5 (Fourth
Meeting of the Consultative Group for the West Bank and Gaza, 1996).
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to saltwater intrusion into the reservoir and increased salinity. 123 Generally speaking, a low discount rate decreases the value of future gains
or losses for a party.
Three main conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis.
First, the Palestinians' expected preventive costs are substantially
greater than those of Israel. Second, the Palestinians' discount rate is
significantly lower than that of Israel. Finally, as a result of the second
conclusion Israel's future positive payoffs are greater than the Palestinians.
Assuming that both Israel and the Palestinians have two principal
strategies, C (cooperate) and D (defect), significant pollution results if
one party cooperates and the other does not cooperate (CD or DC).
Pollution is avoided if both parties adopt cooperative strategies (CC).
Serious contamination takes place if both adopt non-cooperative strategies (DD). Figure 9 sets forth the normal form of the parties' ordinal
payoffs for water contamination of the Mountain Aquifer.
The Palestinians
Israel

C

D

C

4, 2

1, 4

D

3,1

2,3

Figure 9: Ordinalpayoff matrix for Israel and the
Palestiniansre-gardingwater contamination of the
Mountain Aquifer.
The matrix reveals asymmetric preferences.
der of priorities is:
DC> DD > CC > CD124

The Palestinians' or-

123. See Karen Assaf, supra note 110, at 286-89; Reitse Koopmans, Environmental
Problems in the Gaza Strip, in THE 1994 CONFERENCE, supra note 108, at 126, 128-29;
Gaza Isam R. Shawwa, Water Situation in the Gaza Strip, in WATER AND PEACE, supra
note 95, at 251; Ephraim Ahiram & Hanna Siniora, The Gaza Strip Water Problem: An
Emergency Solution for the PalestinianPopulation,id. at 261.
124. In DC, the Palestinians do not bear the expensive costs of preventive measures
but will suffer from significant pollution in the future. As explained above, future negative payoffs are significantly discounted by the Palestinians. In DD, the Palestinians do
not incur the expensive preventive costs but will sustain serious water pollution in the
future; the latter negative payoffs are significantly discounted. In CC, the Palestinians
bear the expensive costs of preventive measures but will benefit from clean water for the
long range; future gains, however, are significantly discounted. In CD, the Palestinians
incur the expensive costs of preventive measures and will suffer significant pollution in
the future; future losses are discounted but the considerable expenses incurred at present
are not.
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Note that the Palestinians' order of priorities is quite similar to a
25
player in a PD game.'
Israel's order of priorities is:
26
CC > DC > DD > CD1
1 27
Israel's order of priorities is the same as in the Assurance game.

An analysis of the above matrix reveals that strategy D is the
dominant strategy for the Palestinians (DC>CC and DD>CD). In other
words, the Palestinians are likely to prefer D regardless of Israel's action. Israel, aware that D is the Palestinians' dominant strategy, is
likely to prefer strategy D as well (DD>CD). Thus, the resulting equilibrium is DD in which both parties prefer not take preventive measures. This equilibrium point represents the Palestinians' second-best
alternative and Israel's third-best alternative. Needless to say, the DD
equilibrium represents the worst environmental alternative.
Characterizing the Palestinians' ordering preferences as similar to
a player's in an infinite iterated PD game may suggest that Israel
should employ contingent strategies (like Tit-for-Tat), which normally
motivate cooperation in such settings. 28 An analysis of the above matrix and the parties' particular properties reveals that Israel's exercise
of a contingent strategy (polluting the aquifer if the Palestinians do so)
is not likely to stimulate the Palestinians into cooperation. The Palestinians will feel the harmful consequences only after several years or
decades. Motivating cooperation by contingent strategies in infinite iterated PD requires the players to have high discount rates.' 29 As discussed above, the Palestinians' discount rate regarding future water
contamination is quite low. More importantly, even if Israel attempts
to remedy the problem of the Palestinians' low discount rate by threatening to employ harsh contingent strategies, such as the Grim Trigger,130 the Palestinians' choice is not expected to change. Regardless of
whether Israel cooperates, since D is the Palestinians' dominant strat-

125. The difference is that in the PD game CC>DD, and in our case DD>CC. See supra Part II.C(2) for a discussion of the PD game and its special properties.
126. In CC, Israel bears the preventive costs but will benefit from future uncontaminated water; Israel's future payoffs are not significantly discounted. In DC, Israel does
not incur the preventive costs but will sustain the harmful results of significant water
pollution in the future. In DD, Israel does not bear the costs of the preventive measures
but will suffer a serious water contamination. In CD, Israel incurs the preventive costs
and will sustain significant water pollution.
127. See supra Part II.C(3) for a discussion of the Assurance Game and its special
properties.
128. See supra Part II.C(2) for a discussion on the role of contingent strategies, including Tit-for-Tat, in PD situations.
129. See supra Part II.C(2).
130. See supra Part II.C(2) for a discussion on the Grim Trigger strategy.
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egy, they are unlikely to be motivated to cooperate in response to a
131
harsh contingent strategy.
In summary, the structure of the setting between Israel and the
Palestinians is clearly asymmetric. The above analysis suggests that
the prospects for cooperation regarding the aquifer setting are unlikely.
Moreover, employment of contingent strategies is not likely to change
the parties' preferences. Unfortunately, the lack of cooperation could
result in long-term damage to the environment.
B.

Employing Legal Mechanisms to Avoid Collective Action Failure

The above game theoretical analysis indicates that cooperation is
not expected to be easily elicited regarding the use and maintenance of
the southern part of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Mountain Aquifer.
Having employed game theory's tools, it may be possible to suggest
some international legal mechanisms to modify the structure of settings
susceptible to collective action failure. The challenge revolves around
creating international settings that are more favorable to international
cooperation and exploring legal techniques available to international
lawyers to further this end.
The most frequent tool employed by international law to change
payoff structures is the formulation of substantive norms, which create
new rights and obligations for States. Establishing a legal obligation to
follow a particular course of action modifies the payoff structure to a
party, who then must contemplate whether or not to pursue the legally
required course of action. Although States usually react unfavorably to
another State's harmful activities, their reaction is compounded when
the detrimental act violates rights prescribed under international
law. 132 Thus, a new legal norm binding parties to a cooperative strategy
in a given sphere increases the negative payoffs generated to a player
who breaches an obligation. For this reason, establishing a legal obligation to cooperate, for instance in a treaty, improves the likelihood of cooperation.
33
The importance of contingent strategies in eliciting cooperation
highlights the role of international rules regarding "countermeasures"
designed to enhance cooperation. International treaty law and customary international law set particular limitations on the use of retaliatory
measures.134 As illustrated below, widening or narrowing the possibil131. This conclusion applies a fortiori to a milder contingent strategy, like Tit-for-Tat.
132. See, e.g, LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE (2d ed., 1979).
133. See supra Part III.C(2-4) for a discussion of the role of contingent strategies to
support cooperation.
134. See, e.g., Article 60 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 8
I.L.M. 679 (1969); Article 30 of the International Law Commissions' Draft Articles on
State Responsibility; (1979) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 115-22 (Vol. II, Part 2); (1992) Y.B.
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ity of retaliation in a given area is likely to affect the prospects for cooperation in that sphere.
International law also supports the prospects for cooperation by iteration of interaction among the parties. 35 The establishment of joint
institutions may be realized by enlarging the "shadow of the future".136
Information is crucial to cooperation in some settings, such as Assurance situations. Indeed, as described below, legal mechanisms facilitating collection and dissemination of information have significantly
contributed to the emergence and maintenance of international cooperation.
The mechanism of linkage may be of great importance to the future
environmental regime in the Middle East. When a particular international setting is susceptible to collective action failure (for instance
when it presents strong features of zero-sum or Chicken game),137 international law can alter the structure of the game by establishing a
linkage between several issue-areas. The structural features of the new
setting, composed of the formerly separated domains, may provide the
parties with adequate incentives to cooperate. As noted above, the environmental settings of the Mountain Aquifer and the southern part of
the Gulf of Aqaba are significantly asymmetric, and the parties are not
likely to adopt cooperative strategies.
Similar asymmetric features are prevalent in other environmental
spheres in the Middle East, such as air pollution. Scientific evidence
gathered in the recent decade, along with well-known data regarding
the general air flow patterns in the Middle East, show that Israel "exports" significant amounts of particulate sulfate and ground-level ozone
(03) to the West Bank, and probably to Jordan. 138 The wind regime in

INT'L L. COMM'N 31-55 (Vol. II, Part 2).
135. See supra Part II.C(2-3) for a discussion on the role of iteration to elicit cooperation. See generally John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of
International Relations Theory and InternationalLaw, 37 HARV. INT'L L. J. 139 (1996)
(discussing iteration in the international law of treaties).
136. Duncan Snidal, The Politics of Scope: Endogenous Actors, Heterogeneity and Institutions, in

LOCAL COMMONS

AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE:

HETEROGENEITY

AND

COOPERATION IN TWO DOMAINS 47 (Robert 0. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995)
[hereinafter LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE].

See Benvenisti, supra

note 58, at 410-13 (discussing the role of institutions and how they can cooperate to intensify interactions, especially regarding the utilization of shared freshwater resources).
137. On the Chicken Game, see generally Hugh Ward, Three Men in a Boat, Two Must
Row: An Analysis of a Three-Person Chicken Pregame, 34 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 371 (1990);
Barton L. Lipman, Cooperation Among Egoists in Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken
Games, 51 PUBLIC CHOICE 315, 316 (1986); Ward, supranote 67, at 354, 367-69.
138. See Menachem Luria et al., TRANSPORTATION OF AIR POLLUTANTS FROM ISRAEL TO
THE JORDAN VALLEY 56 (1996) (in Hebrew); Yossi Sachi et al., Airborne Measurements of
Ozone

Levels

over

Central Israel, in

JUDEA

AND

SAMARIA

RESEARCH

STUDIES-
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the region, mostly from northwest or northeast to the east, 139 and Israel's eastern neighbors' modest level of industrial activity results in a
situation in which transboundary air pollution in the opposite direction
is negligible (from the Palestinian territories and Jordan to Israel).
Asymmetric environmental settings occur regularly in the interna140
tional arena, frequently inhibiting the emergence of cooperation.
Asymmetric preferences often lead the less-interested parties to reject a
legal regime binding them to significant costs.141 If they do join, they
often tend not to comply with the agreement's main obligations. When
any of the major polluting parties adopt this strategy, the overall effectiveness of the environmental regime is significantly undermined. International law may enhance the prospects for cooperation in such
asymmetric settings by creating a link between the legal regimes to be
established for each particular environmental sphere. For instance, a
regime aiming to reduce transboundary air pollution in the Middle East
may be linked to a regime designed to avoid water contamination of the
Mountain Aquifer.
The technique of legal linkage addresses two basic problems arising
in asymmetric environmental settings. First, a legal regime that combines several environmental spheres can provide the less-interested
party in each domain with an incentive to join the comprehensive regime. Second, the establishment of a combined regime widens the opportunities for contingent strategies, which are capable of eliciting co-

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING 339, 340-341 (1995) (in Hebrew; summary

in English); 2 Mordechai Peleg et al., Airborne Measurements of Ozone Levels over Central
Israel, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 10TH WORLD CLEAN AIR CONGRESS 292, 294 (1995); Menachem Luria et al., The Formationof 03 over Israel: A Growing Concern and a Potential
International Issue, in PRESERVATION OF OUR WORLD IN THE WAKE OF CHANGE 13-16

(1996).
139. Uri Dayan, Climatology of Back Trajectoriesfrom Israel Based on Synoptic Analysis, 25 J. CLIMATE & APPLIED METEOROLOGY 591 (1986).

140. Asymmetric preferences, however, may support cooperation in some settings. For
articles discussing conflicting views on whether heterogeneity impedes or supports the
emergence of environmental cooperation, see Lisa L. Martin, Heterogeneity, Linkage and
Commons Problems, in LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE, supra note 136,

at 73; Duncan Snidal, The Politics of Scope: Endogenous Actoers, Heterogeneity and Institutions, id. at 47 and Ronald B. Mitchell, Heterogeneitiesat Two Levels: States, Non-State
Actors and InternationalOil Pollution,id. at 239-40.
141. For example see the position of the United Kingdom, one of the main exporters of
sulfur in Europe, regarding the agreement concluded under the auspices of UNECE to
reduce sulfur emissions. Armin Rosencranz, The Acid Rain Controversy in Europe and
North America: A PoliticalAnalysis, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY 173-

85 (1988); Johaan G. Lammers, The European Approach to Acid Rain, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND POLLUTION 265, 273 (1991); Amy A. Fraenkel, The Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution: Meeting the Challenge of International Cooperation, 30
HARV. INT'L L. REV. 447, 463, 473-74 (1989).
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operation in competitive settings. A party who cannot adopt retaliatory
measures within a particular sphere 142 may find new opportunities in
an expanded regime. These factors suggest that, generally, the broader
the scope of the regional environmental regime in the Middle East (in
terms of the amount and diversification of interests involved), the more
the parties are likely to undertake and comply with its provisions.
Establishing a legal link between the Middle East's various environmental issues enhances the probability that more parties will implement the provisions of the regional regime. Still, such legal linkages
cannot always remedy the problem of asymmetric preferences. One
particular party may be relatively disinterested in all environmental
issues covered by the regional regime. Transboundary air pollution
from Israel, for instance, is not expected to significantly affect Syria and
Lebanon. They represent the "upstream parties" in the Jordan River
basin and the Mediterranean Sea, and they have no significant interest
in the Gulf of Aqaba. Pulling such "persistently" disinterested parties
into the regional effort may require a legal linkage between the regional
143
environmental regime and a non-environmental regime.
While legal linkages may significantly enhance the effectiveness of
any future environmental regime in the Middle East, they also raise
numerous questions. For instance, which legal field is most appropriately to be linked with the environmental sphere? Clearly, the linked
field should be of significant interest to all parties who are likely to affect the quality of the region's principal environmental resources. It
must also represent a relatively stable domain, in that it acknowledges
the parties' long-standing interests.
The field of commercial relations among the Middle Eastern parties
generally meets the above criteria. 144 The legal linkage between issues
of trade and the environment is well established in international environmental treaties, such as the Ozone Layer agreements.1 45 While
much attention has recently been devoted to the legal problems accom-

142. For example, Israel, with regard to water contamination of the Mountain Aquifer
(see Part III.A(2)), or the Palestinians, with regard to air pollution (see Part III.B).
143. See, infra, for a discussion on the possible issue-areas to be linked with the future
environmental regime.
144. On the current and prospective commercial relations between the parties in the
Middle East, see Hisham Awartani, Palestinian-IsraeliEconomic Relations: Is Cooperation Possible?, in THE ECONOMICS OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE: VIEWS FROM THE REGION 281
(1993) [hereinafter THE ECONOMICS OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE]; Natan Zusman, Trade
Agreements as a Part of Peace Agreements-An Historical View, 4 ECON. Q. 630 (1994);
Ephraim Kleiman, Some Basic Problems of the Economic Relationships between Israel, the
West Bank and Gaza, in THE ECONOMICS OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE, id. at 305; Tal Sadeh,
THE ECONOMIC DESIRABILITY OF MIDDLE EAST EASTERN MONETARY COOPERATION 15-18

(The Helmut Kohl Institute for European Studies Working Paper 1/97, 1997).
145. See, e.g., Article 4 of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987).
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panying the linkage between environment and trade, 146 the option remains a viable one for the Middle Eastern environmental regime. The
commercial sphere offers relatively significant and stable benefits to all
parties in the region. Moreover, its importance is expected to grow,
thereby enlarging the range of contingent measures to support effective
cooperation.
Yet establishing a linkage between the environmental and commercial spheres may expose environmental resources to adverse effects
triggered by cross-sector retaliations. A party within the regional
framework may invoke another party's alleged violation of an agreement's commercial provisions in order to justify noncompliance with its
environmental obligations. If frequent enough, such cross-sector retaliatory measures could significantly harm the region's environmental
resources. The problem, however, has a legal solution.
Legal norms may allow cross-sector retaliation in one direction.
With respect to the environment, this means admission of retaliatory
measures for protecting the environment, with a prohibition to operate
such measures against environmental resources. For example, the
technique of "one-way retaliation" frequently occurs under international
human rights law. While various countermeasures, including trade
sanctions, are admissible to protect human rights, reprisals involving
147
human rights violations are strictly forbidden.
C. Information and EnvironmentalCooperationin the Middle East
Information plays a major role in game theoretical analysis. The
collection and dissemination of reliable information often 14s fosters the
prospects for cooperation. This part of the article examines the role of
information in the Middle East's environmental settings and suggests
some legal means for improving the flow of information between the
parties.

146. Among the endless list of publications on this subject, see DANIEL ESTY,
C. FORD RUNGE,

GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE FUTURE 3 (1994);

FREER TRADE, PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT 5 (1994); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Free Interna-

tional Trade and Protection of the Environment:IrreconcilableConflict? 86 AM. J. INT'L L.
700 (1992); Edith Brown-Weiss, Environment and Trade as Partnersin Sustainable Development, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 728 (1992).
147. See Article 60(5) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra
note 134; (1979) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, supra note 134, at 116; (1992) Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N, supra note 134, at 32-33; OMER YOUSIF ELAGAB, THE LEGALITY OF NONFORCIBLE COUNTER-MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 99-104 (1988).

148. It should be noted that complete information may hinder cooperation in some settings. This is clearly the case in PD situations in which cooperation may arise where the
parties lack information regarding the number of the remaining rounds to be played; on
infinite PD games, see Part II.C(2).
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1.

Environmental Standards and Coordination Games

Current use of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Mountain Aquifer is
stretching their respective environmental capacities. Moreover, the expected wave of economic development in the region poses significant
perils to their sustainable use. The need for regional environmental
standards in the Gulf of Aqaba 149 applies a fortiori to the crucial water
reservoir of the Mountain Aquifer. Ensuring future sustainable use of
the Aquifer's water requires standards for establishing and maintaining
adequate sewage infrastructure, as well as for the content of irrigation
fluents in the areas above the aquifer. 150
The formulation of common standards for Middle Eastern parties in
the environmental field should generate an interactive setting, characterized by the features of the Coordination game. Such a setting creates multiple Pareto equilibria positions over which the players have
divergent preferences. Different equilibiria positions generate a distribution problem since each player wants the other to converge on his or
her preferred position. In the Gulf of Aqaba, for instance, Israel is expected to require strict emission standards regarding pollution emitted
from phosphates (transmitted from Jordan),15 1 while Jordan is likely to
insist on more stringent standards for port facilities dealing with loading and unloading crude oil (located in Eilat's Port). The fact that the
Gulf of Aqaba represents an infinite iterated situation, and that the
parties have relatively high discount rates, intensifies the distribution
15 2
problem.
Parties in Coordination settings are expected to misrepresent their
private information. 53 This leads to a situation in which a party does
not trust the information provided by the other players, thus decreasing
the prospects for successful coordination. The tense and suspicious relationships in the Middle East, particularly between the Israelis and
the Palestinians, exacerbate this problem. Entrusting the task of collection and analysis of relevant information to a professional third
party may mitigate the informational problem (e.g., a private consultant or research institute specializing in the particular environmental
field). These specialists must be authorized to travel freely within the
territories of the relevant parties, in order to accomplish their objectives. Needless to say, the parties should be bound to facilitate these
operations by, among other things, providing the specialists with all

149. See supra Part ILI.A(1).
150. For more detail on this problem, see supra Part III.A(2).
151. See Maher F. Abu-Taleb, Environmental Management in Jordan: Problems and
Recommendations, 21 ENVTL. CONSERVATION 35, 36 (1994).
152. On the impact of the discount factor and iteration on the prospects for cooperation
in the Coordination game, see supra Part II.C(4).
153. See supra Part II.C(4).
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necessary data. Finally, in order to foster trust in the specialists, the
parties' representatives should be present in both information gathering and analysis.
The process of agreeing upon environmental standards features
elements found in the Coordination game, but their implementation is
another matter. In a classic Coordination game, once the players agree
on a cooperative solution, their incentive to depart from the coordination point diminishes, and the solution becomes self-enforcing.1 5 4 This
is not necessarily the case when implementing environmental standards in different environmental settings. For instance, the implementation of standards to set up a sewage infrastructure in the Palestinian
cities above the Mountain Aquifer represents the features of the Prisoner's Dilemma. In such cases, the standards are not "self-enforcing"
and their implementation requires relatively strong monitoring and en155
forcement mechanisms.
2.

Conveying Assurances and Information

The above analysis of the structure of the Middle Eastern environmental settings reveals that the Assurance game reflects the relationships between Israel and Jordan in the Gulf of Aqaba. The Assurance
game also reflects the relationship between Egypt and Israel or Jordan
in the northern part of the Gulf; and Israel's preferences regarding the
Mountain Aquifer. Information regarding the other party plays a crucial role in Assurance situations. A player in such a setting is likely to
cooperate if he or she expects the other players to cooperate as well. A
cooperating party is likely to depart from his or her cooperative course
if he or she expects the others to adopt a non-cooperative strategy. 156 A
lack of information and the resulting atmosphere of uncertainty might
lead a player to adopt a non-cooperative strategy. 157
The importance of information in Assurance situations demonstrates the need for an adequate mechanism to ensure transparency.
For example, an effective legal mechanism should prescribe explicit and
detailed provisions binding the parties to prepare a comprehensive Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) regarding any planned measure
with a potentially transborder environmental impact. Parties should
transmit copies of the EIAs to the other parties in each environmental
setting. Establishing a forum for the exchange of information and consultations on planned projects is also highly desirable.

154. For detail, see supra Part II.C(4).
155. See Snidal, Coordination,supra note 59, at 938.
156. See supra Part III.C(3).
157. That may be the case, for instance, where the negative payoffs generated to the
cooperative party in CD are substantial and the expected damage is irreversible.
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Contingent Strategies and Information

As in Assurance situations, information plays an essential role in
the operation of contingent strategies to support cooperation, like infinite PD situations. As noted above, the possibility of effective retaliatory measures is crucial for attaining environmental cooperation in the
comprehensive Middle Eastern regime. 158 Countermeasures are triggered when there is information indicating that the other player has
adopted a non-cooperative strategy. In the absence of reliable information regarding measures taken by the other parties, the effectiveness of
contingent strategies decreases. Similarly, unreliable information may
generate unjustified "retaliatory" measures against a cooperative party.
This may result in the collapse of an otherwise successful cooperation.
These observations lead to the conclusion that a reliable monitoring
mechanism is imperative to ensure environmental cooperation in the
Middle East. The first step is to set out detailed provisions requiring
the parties to provide data on the state of environmental resources under their jurisdiction, as well as the relevant measures to protect the
environment they have already undertaken. Farming out some of the
central functions to a panel of specialists (e.g., for inspections and data
analysis) would enhance the reliability of the information gathered. In
turn, this would promote the prospects for cooperation.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article demonstrates that combining game theory and international law enhances the prospects of international environmental cooperation. The concepts and models of game theory often assist scholars
and policy-makers in identifying why cooperation failed in a given international setting. It may also aid them in predicting settings that are
more susceptible to collective action failure. More importantly, game
theoretical tools can be used to alter the current competitive settings,
while serving as a planning tool for the construction of international regimes more suitable to stable cooperation. Legal mechanisms that
draw on game theory's insights can increase the likelihood of future cooperation in the Middle East. These mechanisms include legal linkage
between particular issue-areas, adequate rules regarding retaliation,
and norms regarding dissemination of information. If the respective
parties adopt these legal mechanisms it will unquestionably promote
environmental cooperation in the Mountain Aquifer and the Gulf of
Aqaba.
As with any handy tool, users should be aware of game theory's
limitations. The advantages of combining game theory and interna-

158. See supra Part III(B).
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tional law should not disguise its inherent imperfections. 15 9 Game
theoretical analysis does not always lead to a unique equilibrium. Indeed, in many cases, multiple equilibria exist. When this occurs, as in
the Coordination game, game theory does not help direct one to the particular outcome of the game. 160 Nonetheless, game theoretical analysis
frequently narrows the number of possible solutions and provides a
limited range of possible outcomes.
Game theory assumes, inter alia, that the players have predetermined goals and that they strive to attain these goals through their actions.161 The theory does not explain which factors motivate a player to
adopt a certain preference and how this preference is modified over
time. The process of emerging and changing preferences is exogenous
to game theory. Additionally, some collective action failure situations
are not amenable to structural alteration designed to support cooperation. In others, the cost of structural change is prohibitive. 162 Where
this is the case it would be more realistic to explore methods of modifying the players' preferences, rather than changing the payoffs aimed at
satisfying these preferences.
Game theory does not aim to explain how preferences are formed.
As noted above, game theory focuses on one set of variables (payoffs,
strategies, information, iteration, discount factors, etc.) influencing decision-makers, but it does not represent a comprehensive theory exhausting all factors involved in international cooperation. Factors such
as the personal characteristics of the decision-makers or social values
prevailing in their community, which may affect the decision-makers'
choices, are exogenous to game theoretical analysis. The absence of
these factors is a central shortcoming of game theory. Yet it also underscores the theory's essential goal of simplifying and abstracting
complex social phenomena into formal models. Focusing on one set of
variables facilitates rigorous analysis and the exploration of interplay
between the variables involved in collective action, such as discount factors and cooperative behavior.
Legal mechanisms, such as retaliatory rules and linkage arrangements, are valuable tools in encouraging international environmental
cooperation. However, the law's capacity to modify existing structures

159. For detail regarding the limitations of game theory, see KEN BINMORE, ESSAYS ON
THE FOUNDATIONS OF GAME THEORY 5-21 (1990); KREPS, supra note 38, at 91-132, 177-83;
HEAP & VAROUFAKIS, supra note 9, at 12-18.
160. See MARTIN HOLLIS, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 137 (1994); KREPS, su-

pra note 38, at 95-102.
161. See supra Part II.A. This assumption reflects the instrumental sense of rationality. See SHAUN H. HEAP, RATIONALITY, IN THE THEORY OF CHOICE: A CRITICAL GUIDE, 4-5

(1992); HEAP & VAROUFAKIS, supra note 9, at 5.
162. Interactive settings, which are hardly amenable to structural change will be
dealt further below.
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depends upon numerous factors. These include the scope of the particular setting and the gap between the payoffs generated to the players
from cooperative and non-cooperative strategies. Generally, the smaller
the setting's dimensions in terms of the extent and the value of the involved resources, the actors' strength, etc., the easier it is to change its
structure. Similarly, legal intervention to support cooperation in competitive settings is more viable when there is a minimal payoff gap (in
favor of non-cooperation). Establishing a legal linkage between several
issue-areas, however, can remedy the problems associated with largescale settings and substantial payoff gaps. Linkage makes it possible to
mobilize adequate resources from different domains to support cooperation in problematic settings.
In conclusion, both game theory and international law have inherent limitations. These limitations occasionally limit their ability to
modify the structure of international settings susceptible to collective
action failure. Nevertheless, the combination of game theoretical
analysis and international law offers scholars and policy-makers important insights in devising suitable legal mechanisms that support international environmental cooperation.

